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RESCUING RULE 3(c) FROM THE 800-POUND
GORILLA: THE CASE FOR A NO-NONSENSE
APPROACH TO DEFECTIVE NOTICES OF APPEAL
PHILIP A. PUCILLO*
[The court’s] “reasoning” is known in forums less august than
this United States Court of Appeals as an “800-pound gorilla
rule.” That is to say, even though this court has no authority
whatever to excuse compliance with Rule 3(c)(1)(C), it
nevertheless has the “power” to do so because more active judges
on this court are willing to excuse noncompliance with the rule
than are unwilling to do so.1
Introduction
The content requirements of a notice of appeal, as set forth in Rule 3(c) of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, could not be more straightforward. The
enforcement of those requirements by the federal courts of appeals, however,
has become quite convoluted. The purpose of this Article is to offer an
approach to the enforcement of Rule 3(c) that is as clear-cut as its requirements.
Rule 3(c)2 prescribes that a notice of appeal “specify the party or parties
taking the appeal”;3 “designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being

* Associate Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law, Ann Arbor, Michigan; A.B.,
Lafayette College; J.D., Tulane Law School. The Author extends his gratitude to Bruce
Frohnen and Edward Lyons for their counsel and encouragement throughout the preparation of
this Article and to Anthony Starkus, Karlye Horton, and Cimarron Gilson for their contributions
to its content.
1. Dillon v. United States, 184 F.3d 556, 559 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
2. Following a restyling of Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1998,
Rule 3(c) was converted from a single paragraph of text into five numbered paragraphs, with
the first of these paragraphs containing the respective content requirements of a notice of appeal
in the lettered subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C). See FED. R. APP. P. 3 advisory committee’s note
(1998 Amendments); 20 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 303App.07[1] (3d ed. 2005); 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD
H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3949.4 (3d ed. 1999). The actual focus of
this Article, therefore, is Rule 3(c)(1). The pertinent provision will nevertheless be referred to
simply as “Rule 3(c)” in order to maintain consistency with references to that provision in cases
and other literature authored prior to the restyling.
3. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(A).
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appealed”;4 and “name the court to which the appeal is taken.”5 When
confronted with a notice that fails to comply with one or more of these
requirements, the federal courts of appeals have resorted to a variety of differing
responses. Some courts, viewing the dictates of Rule 3(c) as jurisdictional in
nature, have simply dismissed the appeal in question for want of jurisdiction.
Rejecting this jurisdictional conception, other courts have reached the merits of
the appeal, despite the violation of Rule 3(c), as long as the violation did not
prejudice or mislead the appellee. Alternatively, in order to avoid the difficult
choice between dismissing the appeal and excusing the violation, some courts
have distorted the relevant requirement of Rule 3(c) in order to conclude that
there was no violation after all.
In fairness to the courts of appeals, their disordered enforcement of Rule 3(c)
stems from faulty direction on the part the Supreme Court of the United States.
In Foman v. Davis,6 the Court characterized noncompliance with the content
requirements of a notice of appeal as “mere technicalities” that can be readily
forgiven when the pertinent defect does not mislead or prejudice the appellee.7
The Court radically shifted course in the subsequent case of Torres v. Oakland
Scavenger Co.,8 where it held that Rule 3(c) is a jurisdictional prerequisite and
emphasized that noncompliance with its requirements was fatal to an appeal.9
However, rather than repudiating Foman as incompatible with its new approach,
the Torres Court simply distinguished Foman on a dubious basis.10 To further
complicate matters, the Court has favorably cited incompatible aspects of
Foman on several occasions since Torres.11
This Article contends that the confusion and unpredictability that has plagued
the enforcement of Rule 3(c) in the courts of appeals can be easily remedied
through the Supreme Court’s prescription of a no-nonsense approach to
defective notices of appeal. First and foremost, this approach would demand
that a court of appeals treat a litigant’s violation of a requirement of Rule 3(c)
as such, rather than resorting to crafty interpretations of the requirement at issue
in an effort to cleanse the notice of the defect. Second, once satisfied that a
violation exists, the court must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction
pursuant to the jurisdictional conception of Rule 3(c) espoused in Torres. To
4. Id. 3(c)(1)(B).
5. Id. 3(c)(1)(C).
6. 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
7. Id. at 181.
8. 487 U.S. 312 (1988).
9. Id. at 317.
10. Id. at 316-17.
11. See Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 767-68 (2001); FirsTier Mortgage Co. v.
Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 276 n.6 (1991).
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the extent that Foman would authorize the court to reach the merits of the appeal
notwithstanding the defect, it is irreconcilable with Torres and must be expressly
overruled.
The proposed approach would have the unfortunate effect of depriving many
litigants of the opportunity to prosecute an appeal, including those litigants who
would have prevailed on appeal were it not for a dismissal based upon a
violation of Rule 3(c). But while the courts of appeals will lack the authority to
determine where justice lies in those individual appeals, a no-nonsense
enforcement of Rule 3(c) would lead to a significantly greater degree of justice
in the totality of appeals by securing a fair and orderly process. Moreover, the
mechanism of rule amendment can always be utilized to ease compliance with
those requirements, or to abolish one or more of them altogether. For these
reasons, a court of appeals may, in good conscience, resist the temptation to
sustain an appeal either by forgiving a Rule 3(c) violation because it did not
mislead or prejudice the appellee, or by dodging that inquiry through the
creation of an “800-pound gorilla rule,” as one circuit judge characterized his
court’s determination that a notice of appeal containing the name of no court of
appeals whatsoever had somehow managed to “name the court to which the
appeal [was] taken” within the meaning of Rule 3(c).12
Part I of this Article provides background on the provisions and doctrines
governing both the timing and content of a notice of appeal. Part II explores the
Supreme Court’s muddled jurisprudence on the content requirements contained
in Rule 3(c), with an emphasis on the Torres Court’s jurisdictional conception
of those requirements and the incompatibility of that conception with the
underpinnings of its prior decision in Foman. Part III, which assesses the postTorres application of Rule 3(c)’s requirements among the courts of appeals,
demonstrates how each of those requirements has been subject to conflicting
enforcement approaches, even within the same court. Lastly, Part IV of the
Article examines how a no-nonsense enforcement of those requirements would
assuage the confusion and unpredictability that conflicting enforcement has
wrought.
I. The Timing and Content Requirements of a Notice of Appeal
In the federal judicial system, the course of action that a litigant must employ
to initiate an appeal from a decision of a district court depends upon the nature
of the decision to be challenged.13 With respect to a decision that a litigant may
12. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See generally FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(C)
(containing the quoted language).
13. In addition to decisions of district courts, a significant component of the federal
appellate docket concerns decisions of federal administrative agencies. A litigant initiates a
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appeal only with the permission of the appropriate court of appeals,14 the
prescribed method is to file with that court a petition for permission to appeal.15
The focus of this Article, however, is on the requisite procedure for commencing
an appeal from a decision that is appealable as a matter of right,16 namely, the
timely filing of a notice of appeal with the district court that rendered the
decision.17
On the surface, a notice of appeal appears to be a document of little to no
significance, considering that it is typically a single page in length and conveys
only a minimal amount of information.18 As many disappointed litigants have
discovered over the years, however, the various requirements of timing and
content that pertain to a notice of appeal carry jurisdictional repercussions.
Accordingly, the failure to comply with those requirements often results in the
loss of an opportunity to appeal.

challenge to the decision of a federal administrative agency not by filing a notice of appeal, but
by filing “a petition for review with the clerk of a court of appeals authorized to review the
agency order.” FED. R. APP. P. 15(a)(1).
14. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000) (“When a district judge, in making in a civil
action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of
Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order . . . .” (emphasis added));
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order
of a district court granting or denying class action certification . . . .” (emphasis added)).
15. FED. R. APP. P. 5(a)(1) (“To request permission to appeal when an appeal is within the
court of appeals’ discretion, a party must file a petition for permission to appeal.”).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (granting appellate jurisdiction over “appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States”); id. § 1292(a)(1) (granting appellate
jurisdiction over “appeals from . . . [i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United
States . . . or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving
injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions”); id. § 1292(a)(2) (granting appellate
jurisdiction over “appeals from . . . [i]nterlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing
orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as
directing sales or other disposals of property”); id. § 1292(a)(3) (granting appellate jurisdiction
over “appeals from . . . [i]nterlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final
decrees are allowed”).
17. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(1) (“An appeal permitted by law as of right from a district court
to a court of appeals may be taken only by filing a notice of appeal with the district clerk . . . .”).
18. See id. app., form 1 (Notice of Appeal to a Court of Appeals from a Judgment or Order
of a District Court); id. 3(c)(5) (“Form 1 in the Appendix of Forms is a suggested form of a
notice of appeal.”).
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A. The Timing Requirements of Rule 4
The starting point for a discussion of the timing and content requirements of
a notice of appeal is Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
provides that “[a]n appeal permitted by law as of right from a district court to a
court of appeals may be taken only by filing a notice of appeal with the district
clerk within the time allowed by Rule 4.”19 The time limit imposed by Rule 4 for
any given appeal depends primarily upon the nature of the underlying action.
In a civil proceeding, a litigant generally has thirty days from the district court’s
entry of a judgment or order in which to file a notice of appeal.20 This thirty-day
limit converts to a sixty-day limit, however, if the federal government (or an
officer or agency thereof) is a party to the litigation.21 In a criminal proceeding,
on the other hand, the time limit depends further upon the status of the
prospective appellant: a defendant has only ten days to file a notice of appeal,22
while the government has thirty days.23
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the preceding timing
requirements of a notice of appeal are jurisdictional in nature. The Court
squarely addressed the issue for the first time in United States v. Robinson.24
Robinson concerned two defendants who sought to challenge a judgment of
conviction in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.25 Their notices of
appeal, however, were filed in excess of the ten-day limit set forth in thenRule 37(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.26 Based upon the
19. Id. 3(a)(1) (emphasis added).
20. Id. 4(a)(1)(A) (“In a civil case, . . . the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be filed
with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.”).
This thirty-day requirement reflects 28 U.S.C. § 2107, which provides in relevant part that “no
appeal shall bring any judgment, order or decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature
before a court of appeals for review unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after the
entry of such judgment, order or decree.” 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2000).
21. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (“When the United States or its officer or agency is a party,
the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order
appealed from is entered.”). This sixty-day limit also reflects § 2107. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b)
(“In any such action, suit or proceeding in which the United States or an officer or agency
thereof is a party, the time as to all parties shall be sixty days from such entry.”).
22. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A) (“In a criminal case, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be
filed in the district court within 10 days after the later of: (i) the entry of either the judgment or
the order being appealed; or (ii) the filing of the government's notice of appeal.”).
23. Id. 4(b)(1)(B) (“When the government is entitled to appeal, its notice of appeal must
be filed in the district court within 30 days after the later of: (i) the entry of the judgment or
order being appealed; or (ii) the filing of a notice of appeal by any defendant.”).
24. 361 U.S. 220 (1960).
25. See id. at 220-21.
26. See id. at 221. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. app. (1958) (repealed
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district court’s finding that the defendants’ failure to file their notices in time
resulted from excusable neglect, the D.C. Circuit held that the notices were
sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the appeals.27
In reversing the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court confirmed the
conclusion, which most courts of appeals had reached by that point, that “the
filing of a notice of appeal within the 10-day period prescribed by Rule 37(a)(2)
is mandatory and jurisdictional.”28 The Court relied primarily upon thenRule 45(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which stated in pertinent
part that “the court may not enlarge the period . . . for taking an appeal.”29
Describing this language as “quite plain and clear,” the Court was satisfied that
“to recognize a late notice of appeal is actually to ‘enlarge’ the period for taking
an appeal” within the meaning of then-Rule 45(b).30 Although noting that
“powerful policy arguments may be made both for and against greater flexibility
with respect to the time for the taking of an appeal,” the Court opined that such
a matter “must be resolved through the rule-making process and not by judicial
decision.”31
1968) (providing the rule in effect at the time of the case: “An appeal by a defendant may be
taken within 10 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from . . . .”). Rule 37(a)(2)
is the predecessor to Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See infra note 31
and accompanying text.
27. Robinson, 361 U.S. at 221-22.
28. Id. at 224.
29. FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(b), 18 U.S.C. app. (1958) (repealed 1968).
30. Robinson, 361 U.S. at 224.
31. Id. at 229. In the wake of Robinson, Rule 37(a)(2) was amended to authorize a district
court to extend the time to file a notice of appeal “[u]pon a showing of excusable neglect.”
FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. app. (Supp. II 1967) (repealed 1968). At the same time,
Rule 37(a)(2)’s counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended to authorize
such extensions in civil cases. See FED. R. CIV. P. 73(b), 28 U.S.C. app. (Supp. II 1967)
(repealed 1968). Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure currently permits
extensions in both civil and criminal cases for either excusable neglect or good cause. See FED.
R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii), 4(b)(4).
XXA civil litigant who cannot make the showing necessary to obtain an extension under
Rule 4(a)(5)(A) can instead bring a motion to reopen the time to file a notice of appeal, which
the district court may grant if all of the following conditions are met:
XX(A) the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered
or within 7 days after the moving party receives notice of the entry, whichever is
earlier;
XX(B) the court finds that the moving party was entitled to notice of the entry of
the judgment or order sought to be appealed but did not receive the notice from
the district court or any party within 21 days after entry; and
XX(C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced.
Id. 4(a)(6). This device reflects the substance of section 2107(c). See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c)
(2000) (“[I]f the district court finds—(1) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment
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Several years after Robinson, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure absorbed the timing requirements prescribed by Rule 37(a)(2), along
with the timing requirements prescribed by its counterpart in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.32 The Supreme Court has since extended to civil
proceedings its determination in Robinson that the timing requirements in
criminal proceedings are “mandatory and jurisdictional.”33 Accordingly, the
jurisdictional nature of Rule 4’s timing requirements in both the civil and
criminal contexts is now firmly established.
B. The Content Requirements of Rule 3(c)
While prescribing the timing requirements of a notice of appeal, Rule 4
provides no direction regarding the information that a notice of appeal must
convey. The subject of content is instead addressed by Rule 3(c) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure,34 which states that a notice of appeal must
“specify the party or parties taking the appeal”;35 “designate the judgment, order,
or order did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry, and
(2) that no party would be prejudiced, the district court may, upon motion filed within 180 days
after entry of the judgment or order or within 7 days after receipt of such notice, whichever is
earlier, reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the order
reopening the time for appeal.”).
32. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) advisory committee’s note (1967 Adoption) (“This subdivision is
derived from FRCP 73(a) without any change of substance.”); id. 4(b) advisory committee’s
note (1967 Adoption) (“This subdivision is derived from FRCrP 37(a)(2) without change of
substance.”).
33. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982); Browder v. Dir.,
Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978). Interestingly, the Browder Court did not rely upon
the language of § 2107(a) in recognizing the jurisdictional nature of the timing requirements of
a notice of appeal in a civil proceeding. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2000) (“Except as
otherwise provided in this section, no appeal shall bring any judgment, order or decree in an
action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature before a court of appeals for review unless notice of
appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such judgment, order or decree.”). Instead,
the Court based its determination on the Robinson Court’s recognition of then-Rule 37(a)(2) as
a jurisdictional prerequisite. See Browder, 434 U.S. at 264.
34. When adopted, Rule 3(c) absorbed the content requirements of a notice of appeal
previously set forth in Rule 73(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 37(a)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) advisory committee’s note
(1967 Adoption) (“This subdivision is identical with corresponding provisions in FRCP 73(b)
and FRCrP 37(a)(1).”).
35. Id. 3(c)(1)(A). In its entirety, this subdivision provides the following:
XX(1) The notice of appeal must:
XX(A) specify the party or parties taking the appeal by naming each one in the
caption or body of the notice, but an attorney representing more than one party
may describe those parties with such terms as “all plaintiffs,” “the defendants,”
“the plaintiffs A, B, et al.,” or “all defendants except X.”
Id. (emphasis added). The emphasized language was added in response to the Supreme Court’s
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or part thereof being appealed”;36 and “name the court to which the appeal is
taken.”37 Notwithstanding the straightforward nature of these requirements,38
it is not uncommon for a litigant to file a notice of appeal that fails to satisfy one
or more of them. A court of appeals confronted with such a document must then
determine if the defect results in a loss of jurisdiction over the appeal.
Unfortunately for the courts of appeals, the question whether the content
requirements of Rule 3(c) have the same jurisdictional significance as the timing
requirements of Rule 4 has proven to be a thorny one for the Supreme Court.
The following section details the Court’s struggle with that question.
II. Rule 3(c) as a Jurisdictional Prerequisite
A. The Appellant-Friendly Approach of Foman v. Davis
The Supreme Court offered its first noteworthy statement regarding the nature
of the content requirements of a notice of appeal in Foman v. Davis.39 Foman
arose from a suit by Lenore Foman against the executrix of her deceased father’s
estate.40 After the district court dismissed Foman’s complaint, she brought
decision in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988). See infra notes 147-59 and
accompanying text.
XXBecause Rule 3(c)(1)(A) requires specification only of the “party or parties taking the
appeal,” FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added), the courts of appeals have by and large
rejected the contention that an appeal is subject to dismissal because the notice of appeal
wrongfully omitted the name of an appellee. See, e.g., Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1031
(7th Cir. 2000); MIF Realty v. Rochester Assocs., 92 F.3d 752, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1996);
Crawford v. Roane, 53 F.3d 750, 752 (6th Cir. 1995); Lackey v. Atl. Richfield Co., 990 F.2d
202, 206 (5th Cir. 1993); Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 531 n.9 (10th Cir.
1992); Hale v. Arizona, 967 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1992); D.C. Nurses’ Ass’n v. District of
Columbia, 854 F.2d 1448, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam); see also 16A WRIGHT, MILLER
& COOPER, supra note 2, § 3949.4 (“Nor need the name of the prospective appellees be set forth
in the body of the notice.”). Contra Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir.
1996) (“Crawford filed a timely notice of appeal as to defendants Medina, Kermendy, and
Milligan only, thus abandoning her claims against defendant Slee.”); Davis v. Fulton County,
90 F.3d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[i]ntended appellees must be provided with
notice that the appeal is being taken . . . and the failure to list all in the notice of appeal could
suggest abandonment of the claims against them”); 20 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2,
§ 303.20[2][b] (“If the notice of appeal specifically names some potential multiple appellees and
fails to name others, jurisdiction over the omitted parties may be denied if they reasonably relied
on the fact that they were not named and prejudice would result from their later inclusion.”).
36. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(B).
37. Id. 3(c)(1)(C).
38. See 20 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 303.20[1] (describing Rule 3(c)’s requirements
as “obviously quite simple”).
39. 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
40. Id. at 179.
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motions to vacate the judgment dismissing her complaint, and to amend her
complaint.41 While these motions were pending, Foman initiated an appeal from
the dismissal of her complaint by filing a notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit.42 The pendency of her motion to vacate judgment,
however, rendered that notice ineffective.43 Foman filed a second notice of
appeal after the district court denied both of her motions.44 Although this second
notice referred to the orders denying her motions, it provided no indication that
Foman sought to appeal from the dismissal of her complaint as well.45
Consequently, with respect to the dismissal of her complaint, Foman had failed
to comply with the mandate of then-Rule 73(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that “[t]he notice of appeal . . . shall designate the judgment or part
thereof appealed from.”46
On appeal, the litigants briefed and argued the merits of the district court’s
dismissal of Foman’s complaint as well as the denials of her motions.47 The
First Circuit nevertheless held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the dismissal
of the complaint.48 The court reasoned that neither of Foman’s notices of appeal
conferred jurisdiction over that ruling, the first notice having no effect and the
second notice failing to indicate that she was taking appeal from the dismissal
of her complaint.49 The court thus limited its review to the denials of Foman’s
motions, affirming on both counts.50

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. The First Circuit construed Foman’s motion to vacate judgment as one brought under
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 180. At that time, the pendency of
a timely Rule 59 motion would have invalidated any notice of appeal filed prior to the
disposition of the motion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 73(a), 28 U.S.C. app. (1958) (repealed 1968)
(providing the rule in effect at the time of the case: “The running of the time for appeal is
terminated . . . and the full time for appeal fixed in this subdivision commences to run and is to
be computed from the entry of any [order] . . . granting or denying a motion under Rule 59 to
alter or amend the judgment . . . .”).
XXUnder the current framework, a notice of appeal filed prior to the disposition of a timely
Rule 59 motion is simply held in abeyance until the disposition of that motion and any related
post-judgment motions. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i).
44. Foman, 371 U.S. at 179.
45. Id. at 180-81.
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 73(b), 28 U.S.C. app. (1958) (repealed 1968). Rule 3(c)(1)(B) of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure currently embodies this directive. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
47. Foman, 371 U.S. at 179-80.
48. See Foman v. Davis, 292 F.2d 85, 87 (1st Cir. 1961).
49. Id. at 87-89.
50. See id. at 87.
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The Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit’s judgment, taking a tack that
was rather charitable to Foman. At the outset of its analysis, the Court
emphasized that “[t]he defect in [Foman’s] second notice of appeal did not
mislead or prejudice the [appellee].”51 The Court reached that determination
after exploring whether Foman had conveyed an intent to appeal from the
dismissal of her complaint, finding that Foman’s “intention to seek review of
both the dismissal and the denial of the motions was manifest” when
considering her two notices of appeal in conjunction with the litigants’ briefs.52
“Not only did both parties brief and argue the merits of the earlier judgment on
appeal,” the Court observed, “but [Foman’s] statement of points on which she
intended to rely on appeal . . . similarly demonstrated the intent to challenge the
dismissal.”53 The Court was satisfied, therefore, that the First Circuit should
have regarded Foman’s second notice of appeal as “an effective, although inept,
attempt to appeal from the judgment sought to be vacated.”54 The Court then
concluded its analysis with the following sentiment:
It is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be
avoided on the basis of such mere technicalities. The Federal Rules
reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper
decision on the merits.55
The precise basis for the Court’s holding that Foman could appeal from the
dismissal of her complaint, despite her failure to designate that ruling in her
notice of appeal in accordance with then-Rule 73(b), is difficult to discern. On
one hand, the Court seemed to espouse the narrow principle that noncompliance
with a content requirement of a notice of appeal is excusable so long as the
violation does not mislead or prejudice the appellee.56 Applying that principle,
the Court would have been unable to conclude that Foman’s failure to designate
the dismissal of her complaint in her only valid notice of appeal was misleading
or prejudicial, considering that Foman had manifested an intent to appeal from
that ruling through her other submissions.

51. Foman, 371 U.S. at 181.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 181-82 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
56. See id. at 181 (observing that “[t]he defect in the second notice of appeal did not
mislead or prejudice the [appellee]”).
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On the other hand, Foman is susceptible to a much broader reading in light
of the Court’s concluding rhetoric. By characterizing Foman’s violation of thenRule 73(b)’s judgment-designation requirement as a mere technicality and
stressing that a court’s refusal to consider the merits of an appeal on that basis
would be “entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,”57 the Court strongly suggested that a failure to comply with a
content requirement of the notice of appeal should virtually never result in
dismissal of an appeal. The Court’s subsequent statement that “[t]he Federal
Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep
by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the
purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits” only serves
to support such a reading.58 Accordingly, the Court likely would have reached
the merits of Foman’s appeal from the dismissal of her complaint even if her
failure to designate that ruling in her notice of appeal had indeed been
misleading or prejudicial to the appellee.
B. A Change of Course in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.
Regardless of the intended effect of Foman, the Court dramatically altered its
conception of the content requirements of the notice of appeal twenty-six years
later in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.59 Torres involved a suit in which
sixteen individuals intervened as plaintiffs after the original plaintiffs to the suit
executed a settlement agreement with the defendant.60 Following the district
court’s dismissal of their complaint, the plaintiff-intervenors filed a notice of
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.61 The caption of the notice
set forth the name of a single plaintiff-intervenor, followed by the phrase “et
al.”62 The body of the notice listed the names of each plaintiff-intervenor in
alphabetical sequence, with the exception of Jose Torres.63 The notice’s
omission of Torres’s name ostensibly resulted from a simple oversight on the
part of his counsel’s secretary.64 Notwithstanding the inadvertent nature of the
omission, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction over
the appeal as it pertained to Torres.65

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
See id. at 181-82 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
487 U.S. 312 (1988).
Id. at 313.
Id.
Brief for Petitioners at 6, Torres, 487 U.S. 312 (No. 86-1845), 1987 WL 880529.
Id.
Torres, 487 U.S. at 313; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 62, at 6.
Torres, 487 U.S. at 317.
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1. Rule 3(c): Party-Specification Requirement
The Court applied a fairly rigid analysis in determining that the notice of
appeal in question did not “specify” Torres as mandated by Rule 3(c) of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.66 In the process, the Court addressed its
prior approach in Foman simply by accepting what it characterized as “the
important principle for which Foman stands,”67 namely, “that the requirements
of the rules of procedure should be liberally construed and that ‘mere
technicalities’ should not stand in the way of consideration of a case on its
merits.”68 Accordingly, the Court continued, a litigant’s filing that is
“technically at variance with the letter of a procedural rule” might nevertheless
comply with that rule if the filing constitutes “the functional equivalent of what
the rule requires.”69 But Torres, in the Court’s view, had failed to file even the
functional equivalent of a notice of appeal, considering that “he was never
named or otherwise designated, however inartfully [sic], in the notice of appeal
filed by the 15 other intervenors.”70 The Court thus determined that Torres did
not satisfy Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement, “even liberally
construed.”71
In so ruling, the Court rejected Torres’s assertion that the inclusion of the
phrase “et al.” in the caption of the notice of appeal had the effect of satisfying
Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement.72 Noting that “[t]he purpose of the
66. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c), 28 U.S.C. app. (1982) (amended 1993) (“The notice of appeal
shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal . . . .”). The party-specification requirement
is now contained in Rule 3(c)(1)(A). See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
67. Torres, 487 U.S. at 316.
68. Id. (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962)). While explicitly referring to
Foman’s statement that “[i]t is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such
mere technicalities,” Foman, 371 U.S. at 181, the Torres Court omitted any reference to a
significant aspect of the immediately following statement in Foman, specifically, that “[t]he
Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by
counsel may be decisive to the outcome.” Id. at 181-82 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). See Torres, 487 U.S. at 316. Presumably, the Court’s omission was deliberate,
considering that Torres turned out to be a case in which “one misstep by counsel [was] decisive
to the outcome.” See Foman, 371 U.S. at 181-82.
69. Torres, 487 at 316-17 (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988)).
70. Id. at 317.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 317-18. Although agreeing with the Court that the notice of appeal’s
inclusion of the phrase “et al.” did not effectively “specify” Torres pursuant to Rule 3(c), Justice
Scalia opined that the principles espoused by the Court should have led to a contrary
conclusion. See id. at 318-19 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If it is the fact that the
requirements of the rules of procedure should be ‘liberally construed,’ that ‘mere technicalities
should not stand in the way of consideration of a case on its merits,’ and that a rule is complied
with if ‘the litigant’s action is the functional equivalent of what the rule requires,’ it would seem
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specificity requirement is to provide notice both to the opposition and to the
court of the identity of the appellant or appellants,”73 the Court explained that
the requirement could be met “only by some designation that gives fair notice
of the specific individual or entity seeking to appeal.”74 The Court found that
“[t]he use of the phrase ‘et al.,’ which literally means ‘and others,’ utterly fails
to provide such notice to either intended recipient.”75 If such a “vague
designation” were sufficient, the Court elaborated, “the appellee and the court
[would be] unable to determine with certitude whether a losing party not named
in the notice of appeal should be bound by an adverse judgment or held liable
for costs or sanctions.”76
2. A Jurisdictional Conception of Rule 3(c)’s Requirements
Although the Court’s analysis regarding Torres’s noncompliance with
Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement was significant, the most profound
implications of Torres emerge from its conception of Rule 3(c)’s requirements
as jurisdictional in nature.77 In this respect, the Court, as it did in Robinson
almost thirty years earlier, relied principally upon the inability of the courts of
appeals to enlarge the time in which a litigant must file a notice of appeal.78 The
to me that a caption listing the first party to the case and then adding ‘et al.’ is enough to suggest
that all parties are taking the appeal; and that the later omission of one of the parties in listing
the appellants can, ‘liberally viewed,’ be deemed to create no more than an ambiguity which
does not destroy the effect of putting the appellee on notice.” (internal citation omitted)).
73. Id. at 318 (majority opinion).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. Rule 3(c) has since been amended to allow for the specification of a party using the
phrase “et al.” See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
77. For a discussion of pre-Torres cases addressing the nature of Rule 3(c)’s partyspecification requirement, see Nancy J. Gegenheimer, Party Names on the Notice of Appeal:
Strict Adherence to Federal Appellate Rule 3 After Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Company, 69
DENV. U. L. REV. 725, 730-32 (1992); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Case Note, Torres v. Oakland
Scavenger Co.: What’s in a Name?—Everything in a Federal Appeal, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
943, 945-48 (1989). See also Kenneth J. Servay, The 1993 Amendments to Rules 3 and 4 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure—A Bridge over Troubled Water—Or Just Another Trap?,
157 F.R.D. 587, 589 nn.17-18 (1994) (collecting cases).
78. The operative provision in Torres was Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which provided the following:
The court for good cause shown may upon motion enlarge the time prescribed by
these rules or by its order for doing any act, or may permit an act to be done after
the expiration of such time; but the court may not enlarge the time for filing a
notice of appeal . . . .
FED. R. APP. P. 26(b), 28 U.S.C. app. (1982) (amended 1998) (emphasis added). The current
version of Rule 26(b), although stylistically and structurally different, has retained the same
substance. See FED. R. APP. P. 26(b)(1) (“For good cause, the court may extend the time
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Court was particularly concerned that “the mandatory nature of the time limits
contained in Rule 4 would be vitiated if courts of appeals were permitted to
exercise jurisdiction over parties not named in the notice of appeal.”79 The
Court explained that, once the time to file a notice of appeal has elapsed, the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction over parties not specified in the notice would
be tantamount to extending the time to file the notice in the first instance.80
“Because the Rules do not grant courts the latter power,” the Court reasoned,
“we hold that the Rules likewise withhold the former.”81
The Court found further support for its jurisdictional conception of
Rule 3(c)’s requirements in the relationship between Rule 3(c) and Rule 4.82 In
particular, the Court deemed Rule 3(c)’s content requirements and Rule 4’s
timing requirements as inextricably linked, based upon its reading of the
following statement issued by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure at the time of Rule 3’s adoption:
Rule 3 and Rule 4 combine to require that a notice of appeal be filed
with the clerk of the district court within the time prescribed for
taking an appeal. Because the timely filing of a notice of appeal is
mandatory and jurisdictional, compliance with the provisions of
those rules is of the utmost importance.83
The Court emphasized that the Advisory Committee’s admonition did not
distinguish the respective requirements of Rule 3 and Rule 4, but instead “treats
the requirements of the two Rules as a single jurisdictional threshold.”84 The
Court was satisfied, therefore, that the Advisory Committee itself regarded
Rule 3(c) as a jurisdictional prerequisite.85
prescribed by these rules or by its order to perform any act, or may permit an act to be done after
that time expires. But the court may not extend the time to file . . . a notice of appeal (except
as authorized in Rule 4) . . . .” (emphasis added)).
79. Torres, 487 U.S. at 315.
80. Id. (“Permitting courts to exercise jurisdiction over unnamed parties after the time for
filing a notice of appeal has passed is equivalent to permitting courts to extend the time for
filing a notice of appeal.”).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 3 advisory
committee’s note (1967 Adoption)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 316 (“Our conclusion that the Advisory Committee viewed the requirements of
Rule 3 as jurisdictional in nature, although not determinative, is of weight in our construction
of the Rule.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
XXIn dissent, Justice Brennan strenuously disagreed with the Court’s interpretation of the
Advisory Committee’s statements:
The comment itself says only that the “timely filing” requirement is mandatory and
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In light of its jurisdictional conception of Rule 3(c)’s requirements, the Court
concluded that the unavoidable consequence of Torres’s failure to abide by the
party-specification requirement was dismissal of his appeal. Even though the
dismissal resulted solely from a deficiency in the notice of appeal at issue, the
Court found no solace for Torres in Rule 3(c)’s safeguard that “[a]n appeal shall
not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal.”86 The
Court explained summarily that “[t]he failure to name a party in a notice of
appeal is more than excusable ‘informality’; it constitutes a failure of that party
to appeal.”87
The Court offered two additional observations of note in connection with its
understanding of Rule 3(c)’s requirements as jurisdictional in nature. First, in
rejecting Torres’s contention that a deficiency in a notice of appeal ought to be
subject to review for “harmless error,” the Court highlighted that the contention
“misunderstands the nature of a jurisdictional requirement: a litigant’s failure to
clear a jurisdictional hurdle can never be ‘harmless’ or waived by a court.”88
Second, the Court explicitly acknowledged that its jurisdictional understanding
of Rule 3(c) had produced “a harsh result in this case.”89 The Court’s
jurisdictional; significantly, the Advisory Committee stopped short of describing
Rules 3 and 4 as jurisdictional in their entirety. Moreover, it is apparent from the
context that the Advisory Committee did not intend to incorporate by reference
every requirement of the two Rules, but rather, only those provisions discussed in
the first sentence of the comment. Rule 3(a) provides that an appeal “shall be
taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within the time
allowed by Rule 4.” It is thus this provision — which is tracked nearly word for
word in the Advisory Committee Note — and not every enumerated requirement
of Rule 3, that combines with Rule 4 to form the jurisdictional requirement “that
a notice of appeal be filed with the clerk of the district court within the time
prescribed for taking an appeal.”
Id. at 322 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c), 28 U.S.C. app. (1982) (amended 1993). The provision in question
currently reads: “An appeal must not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice
of appeal, or for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the
notice.” FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(4) (emphasis added). The emphasized language was added in
response to Torres. See infra text accompanying notes 153-55.
87. Torres, 487 U.S. at 314.
88. Id. at 317 n.3. Notwithstanding the Torres Court’s emphasis that Rule 3(c)’s
jurisdictional requirements cannot be waived, one prominent treatise has opined that courts
should nonetheless waive violations of the judgment-designation requirement in the appropriate
circumstances. See 20 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 303.21[3][c][ii] (“Although the holding
of Torres made clear that the requirements of Appellate Rule 3 are jurisdictional, a technical
mistake in naming the order appealed from should not deprive the court of jurisdiction as long
as the intent to appeal from the order or judgment can be inferred from the record as a whole
and the opposing party cannot show prejudice.”).
89. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318.
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conscience was eased, however, to the extent that “the harshness of our
construction is imposed by the legislature and not by the judicial process.”90
3. Sidestepping Foman
The most intriguing aspect of the Torres Court’s jurisdictional approach to
Rule 3(c)’s requirements was its failure to adequately address the forgiving
approach established in Foman. The Court’s only treatment of Foman in this
regard was to assert that there was no need in Foman to consider whether the
judgment-designation requirement of then-Rule 73(b)91 was jurisdictional in
nature,92 given the Foman Court’s purported conclusion that “in light of all the
circumstances, the Rule had been complied with.”93 This assertion is dubious
at best, however, considering the principal finding in Foman that “[t]he defect
in [Foman’s] second notice of appeal did not mislead or prejudice the
[appellee].”94 Indeed, the Foman Court explored whether Foman’s second
notice of appeal had misled or prejudiced the appellee precisely because that
notice had failed to comply with the judgment-designation requirement at issue.
Regardless of whether the Torres Court was willing to acknowledge it, the
fact remains that its jurisdictional conception of Rule 3(c)’s requirements wholly
repudiated the principles upon which Foman rested. Had the Torres Court
desired to adhere to Foman, its determination that Torres had failed to comply
with Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement would have been followed by
an examination of whether that noncompliance had misled or prejudiced the
appellee.95 Such an approach, however, is entirely contrary to a jurisdictional
conception of Rule 3(c), particularly in view of the Torres Court’s admonition

90. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
91. The Torres Court erroneously cited Rule 3(c) as the operative rule in Foman. See id.
at 316 (“Foman did not address whether the requirement of Rule 3(c) at issue in that case was
jurisdictional in nature . . . .”). In fact, the promulgation of Rule 3 did not occur until several
years after Foman was decided. See FED. R. APP. P. 3 advisory committee’s note (1967
Adoption).
92. While the Torres majority was satisfied that Foman had not addressed whether
Rule 3(c)’s judgment-designation requirement was jurisdictional in nature, Justice Brennan
insisted that Foman had rejected that understanding. Compare Torres, 487 U.S. at 316
(“Foman did not address whether the requirement of Rule 3(c) at issue in that case was
jurisdictional in nature . . . .”), with id. at 322 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (depicting Foman as
holding that “Rule 3(c)’s judgment-designation requirement is not jurisdictional”).
93. Id. at 316 (majority opinion). In making this determination, the Torres Court appeared
to rely primarily upon the statement that Foman’s second notice of appeal should have been
regarded as “an effective, although inept, attempt to appeal from the judgment sought to be
vacated,” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962).
94. Foman, 371 U.S. at 181.
95. See id.
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that “a litigant’s failure to clear a jurisdictional hurdle can never be ‘harmless’
or waived by a court.”96
Nor can the spirit animating Foman’s concluding rhetoric be reconciled with
a jurisdictional conception of Rule 3(c)’s requirements. As observed above, the
Foman Court equated noncompliance with the content requirements of a notice
of appeal as a “mere technicality” that should not preclude the consideration of
appeal on the merits.97 The Court also suggested that the outcome of an appeal
must not hinge on “one misstep by counsel.”98 These ideals, however, are
plainly incompatible with the Torres Court’s holding that a court of appeals
lacked jurisdiction over a litigant’s appeal solely because his counsel’s secretary
mistakenly omitted his name from a notice of appeal. Yet, as the Torres Court
noted, its conception of Rule 3(c) as a jurisdictional prerequisite compelled this
admittedly harsh disposition.99
C. The Affirmation of the Jurisdictional Conception of Rule 3(c)
Notwithstanding any inconsistencies with Foman, the Torres Court’s
conception of Rule 3(c) as a jurisdictional prerequisite has endured. First, in
two post-Torres cases involving allegedly defective notices of appeal, the Court
has expressly described Rule 3(c)’s requirements as jurisdictional in nature.100
Second, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
has posed no challenge to the Torres Court’s conclusion that the committee
itself understood Rule 3(c)’s requirements to be jurisdictional in nature at the
time of Rule 3’s adoption.101 Instead, the committee’s sole response to Torres
has been to amend Rule 3(c) in order to facilitate compliance with the partyspecification requirement.
1. The Court Stands by Torres
The Supreme Court’s initial affirmation of Torres occurred in Smith v.
Barry.102 Smith involved a suit brought by William Smith, a state prisoner, in
which he asserted that various prison officials had violated his rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.103 At the conclusion of trial, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of Smith solely regarding his claims against two
96. Torres, 487 U.S. at 317 n.3.
97. Foman, 371 U.S. at 181.
98. Id. at 181-82.
99. See supra text accompanying note 89.
100. See Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 765 (2001); Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244,
248 (1992).
101. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
102. 502 U.S. 244.
103. Id. at 245.
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prison psychologists.104 The psychologists then timely moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict pursuant Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.105 While that motion was pending, Smith, acting pro se, filed a
notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.106 Smith’s
notice, however, met the same fate as did the first notice of appeal in Foman: the
pendency of a post-judgment motion rendered the notice ineffective.107
Despite the ineffectiveness of Smith’s notice of appeal, the Clerk of the
Fourth Circuit responded to the filing by issuing to the litigants briefing forms
used in pro se appeals to determine the necessity of an appointment of counsel
and/or oral argument.108 Smith completed the form and returned it to the court
within the deadline required for the timely filing of a notice of appeal under
Rule 4.109 Although later conceding the ineffectiveness of his original notice of
appeal,110 Smith opposed dismissal of his appeal on the ground that the briefing
form “effectively substituted for a second notice of appeal.”111

104. Id. at 245-46.
105. Id. at 246.
106. Id. The only ruling that Smith had designated in this notice of appeal was an order
extending the time in which Smith had to file a motion for attorney fees. See Smith v. Galley,
919 F.2d 893, 896 n.7 (4th Cir. 1990), rev’d sub nom. Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992).
107. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988) (amended 1993) (“If a timely motion
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any party . . . for
judgment under Rule 50(b)[,] . . . the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of
the order . . . granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be
filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order disposing of the motion
as provided above.” (emphasis added)).
108. Smith, 502 U.S. at 246.
109. Id. at 246-47.
110. Smith, 919 F.2d at 895.
111. Id. Rule 3(a) required that Smith file his notice of appeal with the district court. See
FED. R. APP. P. 3(a), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988) (amended 1989) (“An appeal permitted by law as
of right from a district court to a court of appeals shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the clerk of the district court within the time allowed by Rule 4.”). Still, his act of filing the
briefing form directly with the Fourth Circuit would not by itself have defeated his argument
that the form substituted as a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(1), a notice of appeal
erroneously filed with the court of appeals would have been deemed filed with the district court
on the date that it was filed with the court of appeals. Id. 4(a)(1), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988)
(amended 1993). Rule 4(d) currently embodies the substance of this provision. See
FED. R. APP. P. 4(d) (“If a notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case is mistakenly filed
in the court of appeals, the clerk of that court must note on the notice the date when it was
received and send it to the district clerk. The notice is then considered filed in the district court
on the date so noted.”).
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The Fourth Circuit rejected Smith’s argument and dismissed his appeal
accordingly.112 Relying upon Torres, the court identified the pertinent issue as
whether Smith’s briefing form was “the ‘functional equivalent’ of a notice of
appeal under Rule 3(c).”113 The court answered in the negative, explaining that
“the document was not the result of Smith’s intent to initiate an appeal,”114 but
instead constituted Smith’s effort to comply with an order of the court issued
subsequent to the filing of an ineffective notice of appeal.115
In reversing the Fourth Circuit’s judgment, the Supreme Court determined
that Smith’s briefing form, or virtually any document for that matter, has the
potential to serve as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal.116 The Court
recognized that a notice of appeal “must specifically indicate the litigant’s intent
112. Smith, 919 F.2d at 896.
113. Id. at 895 (quoting Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 (1988)).
114. Id. at 895-96.
115. Id. at 896.
116. Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1992). Since Smith was decided, the courts of
appeals have deemed a variety of documents as the “functional equivalent” of a notice of appeal,
including: a motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal, see, e.g., Rinaldo v. Corbett,
256 F.3d 1276, 1278-80 (11th Cir. 2001); a motion for certificate of probable cause, see, e.g.,
Rodgers v. Wyo. Att’y Gen., 205 F.3d 1201, 1204-06 (10th Cir. 2000), overruled on other
grounds by Moore v. Marr, 254 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2001); a petition for permission to
appeal, see, e.g., Manion v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 395 F.3d 428, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2004); a petition
for writ of mandamus, see, e.g., In re SDDS, Inc., 97 F.3d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir. 1996); a motion
for appointment of counsel, see, e.g., Campiti v. Matesanz, 333 F.3d 317, 320 (1st Cir. 2003);
a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see,
e.g., Hatfield v. Bd. of County Comm’rs for Converse County, 52 F.3d 858, 860-62 (10th Cir.
1995); a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, see, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 75 F.3d 1137,
1140-41 (7th Cir. 1996); a petition for common-law writ of certiorari, see, e.g., In re Urohealth
Sys., Inc., 252 F.3d 504, 506-08 (1st Cir. 2001); a motion for certificate of appealability, see,
e.g., Marmolejo v. United States, 196 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); a motion for
leave to file a successive motion to attack sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, see, e.g., In re
Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1998); a designation of record on appeal, see, e.g.,
United States v. Adams, 106 F.3d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1997); a motion for clarification of a
ruling, see, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 105 F.3d 793, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam); an
opening brief on appeal, see, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 617-18 (9th
Cir. 1993); and a motion for reduction of sentence, see, e.g., Brannan v. United States, 993 F.2d
709, 710 (9th Cir. 1993). See also 20 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 303.21[2] (enumerating
various documents that have been found to constitute the functional equivalent of a notice of
appeal); DAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL § 8.5 (4th ed. 2000 & Supp.
2005) (same). But see S.M. v. J.K., 262 F.3d 914, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a
docketing statement could not serve as the “functional equivalent” of a notice of cross-appeal
because the plaintiff had provided no reason why the court should exercise its discretion to do
so); Harris v. Ballard, 158 F.3d 1164, 1166 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (concluding that a
motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal cannot serve as the “functional
equivalent” of a notice of appeal because it does not express an intention to appeal).
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to seek appellate review,” pointing out that “the purpose of this requirement is
to ensure that the filing provides sufficient notice to the other parties and the
courts.”117 Insisting that a document’s sufficiency as a notice of appeal is a
function of the notice that it affords, and not of a litigant’s subjective motivation
in filing it, the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on Smith’s purpose
for submitting the briefing form.118 “If a document filed within the time
specified by Rule 4 gives the notice required by Rule 3,” the Court concluded,
“it is effective as a notice of appeal.”119
A striking feature of the Court’s analysis in Smith was its express affirmation
of the Torres Court’s understanding of Rule 3(c) as a jurisdictional prerequisite.
Noting that the “principle of liberal construction” allowing a court of appeals to
regard a document as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal does not
excuse noncompliance with Rule 3(c),120 the Court made clear that “Rule 3’s
dictates are jurisdictional in nature, and their satisfaction is a prerequisite to
appellate review.”121 “Although courts should construe Rule 3 liberally when
determining whether it has been complied with,” the Court continued,
“noncompliance is fatal to an appeal.”122
Applying these principles to the circumstances before it, the Court held that
the content of Smith’s briefing form would determine the Fourth Circuit’s
jurisdiction over his appeal.123 In particular, the Court observed that the
appellees had challenged the validity of Smith’s briefing form as a notice of
appeal on the basis that it failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 3(c).124
117. Smith, 502 U.S. at 248.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 248-49 (stating further that the Federal Rules “do not preclude an appellate court
from treating a filing styled as a brief as a notice of appeal . . . if the filing is timely under Rule 4
and conveys the information required by Rule 3(c)”).
120. Id. at 248.
121. Id. (citing Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1988)). In
determining whether a specific document qualifies as the “functional equivalent” of a notice of
appeal, some courts of appeals have been more careful than others to ensure that the document
satisfies Rule 3(c)’s requirements. Compare Campiti, 333 F.3d at 320 (“Admittedly, the
document does not specify the judgment appealed from or the appellate court; but here, where
no doubt exists as to either, Rule 3 buttressed by latitude for a pro se litigant forgives these
‘informalit[ies] of form.’” (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(4)) (alteration in original)), with
Andrade v. Att’y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 752 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 538
U.S. 63 (2003) (“Andrade’s motion for extension of time satisfied the three notice requirements
of Rule 3(c)(1): it identified the judgment at issue, it specified the court to which the appeal
would be taken, and it was delivered to both the district court and the opposing party.”).
122. Smith, 502 U.S. at 248.
123. Id. at 249.
124. Id. at 250 (noting the respondents’ contention that “Smith’s brief is not an adequate
notice of appeal because it lacks information required by Rule 3(c)”).
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Because the Fourth Circuit had not addressed that issue, opting instead to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that Smith’s briefing form could not serve as
the “functional equivalent” of a notice of appeal, the Court directed the Fourth
Circuit to “undertake the appropriate analysis” on remand.125
Almost ten years after Smith, the Supreme Court again affirmed the Torres
Court’s jurisdictional understanding of Rule 3(c) in Becker v. Montgomery.126
Dale Becker, acting pro se, brought an action to recover for alleged exposure to
second-hand smoke while incarcerated in an Ohio prison.127 After the district
court dismissed his complaint, Becker filed a notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.128 Although the notice fulfilled the requirements
of Rule 3(c),129 Becker typed his name “[o]n the line tagged ‘(Counsel for
Appellant)’” instead of signing it by hand.130 The Sixth Circuit concluded that
the notice’s lack of a handwritten signature violated Rule 11(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and on that basis dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.131
In the Supreme Court’s view, the Sixth Circuit had correctly concluded that
Rule 11(a) obligated Becker to hand-sign his notice of appeal.132 The Court thus
125. Id. On remand, the appellees asserted that Smith had failed to comply with Rule 3(c)’s
judgment-designation requirement because his briefing form simply sought “[a] new trial on all
issues triable by Jury.” Smith v. Barry, 985 F.2d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 1993) (alteration in
original) (internal quotations omitted). The Fourth Circuit agreed with the appellees’ position
to the extent that Smith sought to appeal from the district court’s pretrial dismissal of one of the
defendants. Id. at 184 (“Dr. Barry’s dismissal was not an issue triable by jury.”). However,
regarding Smith’s effort to appeal from the district court’s entry of a directed verdict in favor
of six other defendants at the close of Smith’s case, the Fourth Circuit construed the form as
containing the “functional equivalent of the specifications required by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 3(c)” because the claim in question “went to trial before a jury.” Id.
126. 532 U.S. 757 (2001).
127. Id. at 760.
128. Id. at 760-61.
129. Id. (“Using a notice of appeal form printed by the Government Printing Office, Becker
filled in the blanks, specifying himself as sole appellant, designating the judgment from which
he appealed, and naming the court to which he appealed.” (citing FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1))).
130. Id. at 759-60.
131. Id. at 760-61. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (“Every pleading, written motion, and
other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name,
or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party.” (emphasis
added)). In so ruling, the Sixth Circuit relied upon its previous decision in Mattingly v. Farmers
State Bank, 153 F.3d 336, 338 (6th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the appeal because “[t]he notice of appeal was not signed, [and] the omission
was not corrected within the 30-day appeal period of Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)”).
132. See Becker, 532 U.S. at 764 (“As Rule 11(a) is now framed, we read the requirement
of a signature to indicate, as a signature requirement commonly does, and as it did in John
Hancock’s day, a name handwritten (or a mark handplaced).”).
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rejected Becker’s contention that the appearance of his name in typewritten form
on the notice was sufficient.133 The Court was satisfied, however, that such a
notice could withstand a violation of Rule 11(a)’s signature requirement “so
long as the appellant promptly supplies the signature once the omission is called
to his attention.”134 Because Becker eventually proffered a duplicate notice of
appeal containing the requisite handwritten signature, the Court concluded that
the Sixth Circuit had improperly dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.135
In so holding, the Court expressly affirmed the Torres Court’s conception of
Rule 3(c) as a jurisdictional prerequisite.136 The Court distinguished
Rule 11(a)’s signature requirement from the content and timing requirements
contained in Rule 3 and Rule 4, respectively,137 emphasizing that the latter two
“are indeed linked jurisdictional provisions.”138 Observing that the signature
requirement derives from Rule 11(a) as opposed to Rule 3(c), the Court
determined that Rule 11(a) “alone calls for and controls that requirement and
renders it nonjurisdictional.”139
2. The Response of the Advisory Committee
In the wake of Torres, the courts of appeals began to demand meticulous
compliance with Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement.140 Given the
Torres Court’s characterization of the phrase “et al.” as a “vague designation”
that “utterly fails” to provide the requisite notice to the intended recipients,141 a
133. See id. at 763.
134. Id. at 760. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (“An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless
omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney
or party.”).
135. Becker, 532 U.S. at 765.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 765-66.
138. Id. at 765 (emphasis added); see Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315
(1988) (“This admonition by the Advisory Committee makes no distinction among the various
requirements of Rule 3 and Rule 4; rather, it treats the requirements of the two Rules as a single
jurisdictional threshold.”).
139. Id. at 766; see also 20 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 303.21[3][b][i] (“[S]ince a
signature is not one of the jurisdictional requirements of Appellate Rule 3, but rather a
nonjurisdictional requirement of Civil Rule 11, the omission of a signature from a notice of
appeal does not deprive the circuit court of appellate jurisdiction.”).
140. See, e.g., Allen Archery, Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equip., Inc., 857 F.2d 1176, 1177
(7th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (stating that “[Torres] requires us to insist on punctilious, literal,
and exact compliance” with Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement). For additional
discussion of post-Torres decisions applying Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement, see
Gegenheimer, supra note 77, at 732-41. See also Servay, supra note 77, at 591-92 nn.38-39
(collecting cases).
141. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318.
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notice of appeal’s inclusion of “et al.” usually provided no recourse to a
prospective appellant whose name was not otherwise specified in the notice.142
Nor could such a party, in the view of most courts of appeals, be effectively
specified by a notice’s use of a plural generic term such as “plaintiffs” or
“defendants.”143 What is more, some courts held that the specification of a party

142. See, e.g., Regalado v. City of Commerce City, 20 F.3d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 1994);
Mallas v. United States, 993 F.2d 1111, 1116-17 (4th Cir. 1993); Moore v. Warehouse Club,
Inc., 992 F.2d 27, 28 n.1 (3d Cir. 1993); Colle v. Brazos County, 981 F.2d 237, 240-43 (5th
Cir. 1993); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Lehnen, 974 F.2d 66, 67 (8th Cir. 1992); Adkins v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 968 F.2d 1317, 1318-19 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Ooley v. Schwitzer Div., 961 F.2d 1293,
1305-06 (7th Cir. 1992); Buck v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 960 F.2d 603, 603 n.1 (6th Cir. 1992);
Walter v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists Pension Fund, 949 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1991);
Pontarelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 108-09 (1st Cir. 1991); Worlds v. Dep’t of Health and Rehab.
Servs., Fla., 929 F.2d 591, 592-93 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); United States v. Tucson Mech.
Contracting, Inc., 921 F.2d 911, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1990); Baylis v. Marriot Corp., 906 F.2d 874,
877 (2d Cir. 1990); Baucher v. E. Ind. Prod. Credit Ass’n, 906 F.2d 332, 333-34 (7th Cir.
1990).
XXNotwithstanding the Supreme Court’s determination that the use of “et al.” in a notice of
appeal failed to satisfy Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement, several courts of appeals
recognized particular situations in which the phrase would suffice. For example, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, in a case involving only two parties with standing to
appeal, the inclusion of “et al.” would specify the unnamed party. See, e.g., Pope v. Miss. Real
Estate Comm’n, 872 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Moreover, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the inclusion of “et al.” as sufficient to satisfy the
party-specification requirement when the body of the notice of appeal also contained a plural
generic term such as “plaintiffs” or “defendants.” See, e.g., Benally v. Hodel, 940 F.2d 1194,
1197 (9th Cir. 1990). On occasion, the court found that the plural generic term sufficed on its
own. See, e.g., Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1991).
XXInterestingly, although “et al.” typically was not an effective means of specifying a party
whose name did not otherwise appear in a notice of appeal, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit held that the use of the Latin phrase “et ux.” (meaning “and wife”) immediately after a
litigant’s name was sufficient to specify his wife. Milanovich v. Costa Crociere, 938 F.2d 297,
298 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam). The court reasoned that, while “et al.” might refer to “an
entire class of unnamed individuals or just to some members of that class,” the phrase “et ux.”
could refer only to the wife of the specified appellant. Id.
143. See, e.g., Mallas, 993 F.2d at 1116-17; Colle, 981 F.2d at 242; Lehnen, 974 F.2d at 67;
Adkins, 968 F.2d at 1319; Pontarelli, 930 F.2d at 108-09; Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Mgmt., Inc.
Employee Sav. Plan & Trust, 920 F.2d 651, 654-55 (10th Cir. 1990); Pride v. Venango River
Corp., 916 F.2d 1250, 1251-53 (7th Cir. 1990); Minority Employees of the Tenn. Dep’t of
Employment Sec., Inc. v. Tenn. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 901 F.2d 1327, 1332 (6th Cir.
1990) (en banc).
XXThe Court of Appeals for the First Circuit went so far as to conclude that the use of terms
such as “all plaintiffs” or “all defendants” in a notice of appeal was not sufficient to satisfy the
party-specification requirement. See Santos-Martinez v. Soto-Santiago, 863 F.2d 174, 175-76
(1st Cir. 1988).
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was valid only when appearing in the body of a notice of appeal, as opposed to
its caption.144
The post-Torres insistence upon scrupulous compliance with Rule 3(c)’s
party-specification requirement posed particular problems for litigants who
sought to appeal on behalf of other parties in addition to themselves. In the
context of a class action (or putative class action), most courts of appeals did not
consider a notice of appeal’s specification of a class representative, without
some mention of the representative’s status, as encompassing the class
members.145 Moreover, a notice’s specification of one litigant typically was not
regarded as a sufficient means of specifying members of that litigant’s family as
well.146
In an effort to relax some of the exacting standards of compliance that many
courts of appeals had begun to enforce after Torres, the Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure crafted a series of amendments to
Rule 3(c), which took effect in December 1993.147 Under the Rule as amended,
an attorney representing various parties in a case could specify each of them
using the phrase “et al.,” or with a plural generic term such as “the defendants”
or “all plaintiffs.”148 The amended Rule also provided that the inclusion of the
144. See, e.g., All Pac. Trading, Inc. v. Vessel M/V Hanjin Yosu, 7 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th
Cir. 1993); Allen Archery, 857 F.2d at 1177. But see James v. United States, 970 F.2d 750, 752
n.3 (10th Cir. 1992) (referring to the caption in determining whether the party-specification
requirement had been met); Samaad v. City of Dallas, 922 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1991) (same);
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 913 F.2d 419, 423-24 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 875 F.2d 927, 931 (1st Cir. 1989) (same).
145. See, e.g., Griffith v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1993); Hammon v. Kelly, 980
F.2d 785, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Ooley, 961 F.2d at 1305-06; Reed v. Int’l Union of United
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 945 F.2d 198, 199 n.1 (7th Cir. 1991).
But see Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 885 F.2d 1060, 1061 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989) (amended
complaint’s listing of all plaintiffs as “representatives of the plaintiff class” specified the class
members by implication in the notice of appeal); Rendon v. AT&T Techs., 883 F.2d 388, 398
n.8 (5th Cir.1989) (inclusion of “et al.” immediately after the name of the class representatives
specified the remaining members of that class).
146. See, e.g., Regalado, 20 F.3d at 1106; Buck, 960 F.2d at 603 n.1. Contra Colle, 981
F.2d at 241 (notice of appeal’s specification of a parent encompasses a child on whose behalf
the parent sues).
147. For a critical assessment of these amendments, see Servay, supra note 77, at 593-97.
See generally FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) advisory committee’s note (1993 Amendments). Many courts
of appeals retroactively applied these amendments in order to sustain appellate jurisdiction over
litigants who otherwise would not have satisfied the party-specification requirement after
Torres. E.g., Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1275-76 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Frey v. City of
Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 670 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995); Cleveland v. Porca Co., 38 F.3d 289, 29394 (7th Cir. 1994); Dodger’s Bar & Grill, Inc. v. Johnson County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 32
F.3d 1436, 1440-41 (10th Cir. 1994); Garcia v. Wash, 20 F.3d 608, 609-10 (5th Cir. 1994).
148. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(A) (stating that the party-specification requirement is satisfied
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party’s name solely in the notice’s caption would suffice.149 It follows that, had
these amendments been in force at the time of Torres, the notice of appeal at
issue in that matter would have effectively specified Jose Torres despite its
failure to list his name in the body.150
The amended rule also makes clear that, in certain instances, the specification
of one party in a notice of appeal will specify other related parties whose names
did not otherwise appear in a notice of appeal. In particular, a notice’s
specification of a single class representative in the context of a class action —
or putative class action — encompasses each member of the pertinent class.151
Moreover, the specification of a party who proceeds pro se presumptively
encompasses his or her spouse and minor children.152
when “an attorney representing more than one party . . . describe[s] those parties with such
terms as ‘all plaintiffs,’ ‘the defendants,’ ‘the plaintiffs A, B, et al.,’ or ‘all defendants except
X’”); see also id. 3(c) advisory committee’s note (1993 Amendments) (stating that “in order
to prevent the loss of a right to appeal through inadvertent omission of a party's name or
continued use of such terms as ‘et al.,’ which are sufficient in all district court filings after the
complaint, the amendment allows an attorney representing more than one party the flexibility
to indicate which parties are appealing without naming them individually”).
XXDespite this amendment, a notice of appeal’s use of a plural generic term will not necessarily
suffice to specify the pertinent individual parties. For example, the First Circuit has held that
a notice of appeal referencing “the consolidated plaintiffs” did not specify the individual parties
who made up that group because the notice was filed by an attorney who did not represent them.
See Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de P.R., 187 F.3d 30, 58-59 & n.48 (1st Cir. 1999) (per
curiam).
149. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(A) (stating that the party-specification requirement is satisfied
“by naming each [party] in the caption or body of the notice”). See, e.g., Spain v. Bd. of Educ.
of Meridian Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 101, 214 F.3d 925, 929 (7th Cir. 2000) (relying upon
Rule 3(c)(1)(A) in concluding that the party-specification requirement was satisfied even though
the appellant’s name appeared in the caption, but not in the body, of the notice of appeal).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
151. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(3) (“In a class action, whether or not the class has been certified,
the notice of appeal is sufficient if it names one person qualified to bring the appeal as
representative of the class.”); see id. 3(c) advisory committee’s note (1993 Amendments).
XXAlthough this amendment has facilitated compliance with the party-specification
requirement in class actions, there is still room for error. In particular, the Seventh Circuit has
held that a notice of appeal will specify an entire class (or putative class) of individuals only if
it specifies at least one individual qualified to appeal on behalf of that class, see Clay v. Fort
Wayne Cmty. Schs., 76 F.3d 873, 876-77 (7th Cir. 1996), and expressly states that the
individual in question is appealing as a class representative, see Murphy v. Keystone Steel &
Wire Co., 61 F.3d 560, 569-71 (7th Cir. 1995).
152. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(2) (“A pro se notice of appeal is considered filed on behalf of the
signer and the signer’s spouse and minor children (if they are parties), unless the notice clearly
indicates otherwise.”); see id. 3(c) advisory committee’s note (1993 Amendments); see also Ms.
S. v. Vashon Island Sch. Dist., 337 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003) (relying upon
Rule 3(c)(2) in concluding that the notice of appeal’s specification as a pro se appellant also
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Lastly, Rule 3(c)’s provision that “[a]n appeal must not be dismissed for
informality of form or title of the notice,”153 which the Torres Court had rejected
as a basis to save Jose Torres’s appeal,154 was amended to add the clause “or for
failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the
notice.”155 Elaborating upon this latter amendment in the accompanying notes,
the Advisory Committee explained that “[i]f a court determines it is objectively
clear that a party intended to appeal, there are neither administrative concerns
nor fairness concerns that should prevent the appeal from going forward.”156
Significantly, the preceding amendments to Rule 3(c), which constitute the
entirety of the Advisory Committee’s response to Torres, did not in any manner
question or challenge the Torres Court’s conception of Rule 3(c) as a
jurisdictional prerequisite.157 A review of the text of the amendments, along
with the committee’s accompanying notes, makes plain that the committee’s
exclusive objective was to facilitate compliance with Rule 3(c)’s partyspecification requirement.158 Considering that the Torres Court’s jurisdictional
understanding of Rule 3(c) was informed in part by its view that the Advisory
Committee itself had a jurisdictional understanding of Rule 3(c),159 the
committee’s tacit acceptance of that understanding strongly suggests that it
approved of the Torres Court’s approach.
D. The Affirmation of Foman Too?
The Torres Court’s jurisdictional understanding of Rule 3(c)’s requirements
would appear to be firmly established, given its explicit affirmation in both
Smith and Becker, and its implicit affirmation by the silence of the Advisory
Committee. On two occasions since Torres, however, the Court has cited
encompassed her daughter).
153. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(4).
154. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
155. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(4).
156. Id. 3(c) advisory committee’s note (1993 Amendments).
157. See 20 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 303.21[3][a][ii] (noting that “the 1993
amendment does not alter that part of the Torres decision that held that the specification
requirements of Appellate Rule 3 are jurisdictional; it simply made the requirements easier to
meet”); Servay, supra note 77, at 594 (“Importantly, while the amendments to Rule 3(c) make
adjustments in what constitutes compliance with this requirement, nothing in [the] amendments
or in the advisory committee notes suggest [sic] that the new rule is any less jurisdictional.
Thus, the most important part of the Torres ruling — that appeals must be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction where a party fails to comply with the requirements of the rule — has not been
overruled.”).
158. See Servay, supra note 77, at 594 (observing that the 1993 amendments “dealt only
with one of the three requirements of Rule 3(c) — that the notice of appeal name the party or
parties appealing”).
159. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
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Foman in connection with propositions that simply cannot be reconciled with
that understanding. These references suggest that the Court is not yet prepared
to abandon a more forgiving approach toward noncompliance with the content
requirements of a notice of appeal than a jurisdictional conception of Rule 3(c)
would permit.
The first such reference to Foman occurred in FirsTier Mortgage Co. v.
Investors Mortgage Insurance Co.,160 which the Court decided only three years
after Torres. FirsTier involved insurance policies that FirsTier Mortgage Co.
had procured from Investors Mortgage Insurance Co. to protect against the risk
of default on a set of eight real-estate loans.161 FirsTier brought suit against
Investors when, after each of the eight borrowers defaulted on the insured loans,
Investors refused to pay FirsTier the policy proceeds.162 At the conclusion of
oral argument on Investors’ motion for summary judgment, the district court
advised the litigants of its intention to grant the motion on the basis that
FirsTier’s fraud or bad faith in procuring the policies had voided them.163
FirsTier filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s bench ruling several
weeks later.164 The district court did not enter a judgment encapsulating that
ruling, however, until almost one month after FirsTier filed its notice of
appeal.165 The issue then became whether FirsTier’s notice remained effective
to appeal from the judgment that the district court subsequently entered.166 The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that the notice was fatally
premature, and dismissed FirsTier’s appeal accordingly.167
In reversing the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion, the Supreme Court focused upon
the relation-forward provision of Rule 4(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which provided that “a notice of appeal filed after the announcement
of a decision or order but before the entry of the judgment or order shall be
treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.”168 According to the
Court, “Rule 4(a)(2) permits a notice of appeal from a nonfinal decision to
operate as a notice of appeal from the final judgment only when a district court
160. 498 U.S. 269 (1991).
161. Id. at 270.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 270-71.
164. Id. at 272.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988) (amended 1993). The substance of the
current version of Rule 4(a)(2) is virtually the same, with only minor stylistic changes. See
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2) (“A notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision or order
but before the entry of the judgment or order is treated as filed on the date of and after the
entry.”).
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announces a decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the
entry of judgment.”169 The Court was confident that, in such instances, “a
litigant’s confusion is understandable, and permitting the notice of appeal to
become effective when judgment is entered does not catch the appellee by
surprise.”170 Accordingly, “[l]ittle would be accomplished by prohibiting the
court of appeals from reaching the merits of such an appeal.”171
Regarding the matter before it, the Court was satisfied that FirsTier’s notice
of appeal from the district court’s bench ruling was effective to appeal from its
summary judgment in favor of Investors.172 Assuming arguendo that the bench
ruling was not final because the district court could have changed course before
entering judgment, the Court noted that the bench ruling “did announce a
decision purporting to dispose of all of FirsTier’s claims.”173 If the district court
had entered judgment immediately following the bench ruling, the Court
continued, the bench ruling undoubtedly would have constituted a “final
decision” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.174 Under the circumstances,
the Court found that FirsTier’s belief in the finality of the bench ruling was
reasonable, and thus its premature notice of appeal was effective to appeal from
the judgment that the district court ultimately entered.175
For reasons that are not entirely clear, the Court felt obliged to reconcile its
determination concerning the effectiveness of FirsTier’s premature notice of
appeal with Rule 3(c)’s judgment-designation requirement.176 Presumably, the
Court was concerned that its ruling would permit FirsTier to appeal from the
district court’s judgment even though FirsTier mentioned only the bench ruling
in its notice of appeal. The Court appealed to Foman in this regard,
characterizing that case as establishing that “a notice of appeal that designates
a postjudgment motion should be treated as noting an appeal from the final
judgment when the appellant’s intention to appeal the final judgment is
sufficiently ‘manifest’ that the appellee is not misled.”177 Applying this
principle to the Rule 4(a)(2) context, the Court stated that a notice of appeal
from a decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the entry
of judgment, such as the district court’s bench ruling in favor of Investors,
169. FirsTier, 498 U.S. at 276.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 277.
173. Id.
174. Id. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (granting the courts of appeals jurisdiction
over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States”).
175. FirsTier, 498 U.S. at 277.
176. Id. at 276-77. See generally FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(B) (mandating that a notice of
appeal “designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed”).
177. FirsTier, 498 U.S. at 276 n.6 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962)).
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“sufficiently manifests an intent to appeal from the final judgment for purposes
of Rule 3(c).”178
Although the FirsTier Court offered an acceptable statement of the Foman
holding, its application of Foman to the Rule 4(a)(2) context is utterly
inconsistent with the jurisdictional conception of Rule 3(c)’s reach in Torres
only three years earlier. Indeed, in rejecting the position that the courts of
appeals should review violations of Rule 3(c) for harmless error, the Torres
Court emphasized that “a litigant’s failure to clear a jurisdictional hurdle can
never be ‘harmless’ or waived by a court.”179 Under Torres, therefore, a court
of appeals simply lacks the authority to pardon a notice of appeal’s failure to
designate a ruling pursuant to Rule 3(c)’s judgment-designation requirement,
even if the appellant’s intention to appeal from that ruling was sufficiently
manifest that the appellee was not misled. Accordingly, the FirsTier Court’s
favorable reference to Foman, not to mention its application of Foman to the
Rule 4(a)(2) context, suggests that Rule 3(c)’s judgment-designation
requirement is not entirely jurisdictional in nature after all.
The second instance in which the Court cited Foman in a manner that
contravened the Torres Court’s jurisdictional understanding of Rule 3(c)’s
requirements was, oddly enough, in Becker. As discussed earlier, Becker
explicitly recognized a conception of Rule 3(c) as a jurisdictional prerequisite
in distinguishing Rule 11(a)’s signature requirement from the content and timing
requirements of Rules 3(c) and 4, respectively.180 Toward the close of its
opinion, however, the Court gratuitously observed that, unlike in Torres, the
matter before it did not involve a notice of appeal that failed to satisfy
Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement.181 The Court then stated, even more
gratuitously, that “[o]ther opinions of this Court are in full harmony with the
view that imperfections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal when no
genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, to which
appellate court,” and cited both Smith and Foman in support of the statement.182
178. Id. at 277 n.6.
179. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 n.3 (1988).
180. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
181. Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 767 (2001).
182. Id. (citing Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245 (1992); Foman, 371 U.S. at 181). The
Court recently reiterated this exact quotation, complete with the references to Smith and Foman,
in Scarborough v. Principi:
Permitting a late signature to perfect an appeal, we explained, was hardly
pathbreaking, for “[o]ther opinions of this Court are in full harmony with the view
that imperfections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine
doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, to which appellate
court.”
541 U.S. 401, 416 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Becker, 532 U.S. at 767-768 (citing
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In so doing, the Court parenthetically described Foman as holding that “an
appeal was improperly dismissed when the record as a whole — including a
timely but incomplete notice of appeal and a premature but complete notice —
revealed the orders [Foman] sought to appeal.”183
Although the statement that “imperfections in noticing an appeal should not
be fatal when no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what
judgment, to which appellate court”184 is relatively innocuous when reviewed in
isolation,185 it becomes quite troubling when considered in combination with its
reference to Foman. Notably, the statement failed to make clear that the notice
of appeal itself must convey “who is appealing, from what judgment, to which
appellate court,”186 as Rule 3(c) would demand.187 The statement’s failure in this
respect created an ambiguity regarding whether a submission other than a notice
of appeal may properly convey that information. But the Court then effectively
resolved that ambiguity with its citation of Foman and corresponding
description of Foman as holding that “an appeal was improperly dismissed when

Smith, 502 U.S. at 245, 248-49; Foman, 371 U.S. at 181)). At issue in Scarborough was
whether a litigant may amend a timely application for an award of fees under the Equal Justice
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000) (authorizing an award of fees to a prevailing party in an
action against the United States), after expiration of the thirty-day filing period, in order to cure
an initial failure to allege that the government’s position in the underlying litigation was not
“substantially justified” within the meaning of § 2412(d)(1)(A). Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 41819. The Court’s conclusion that such an amendment was permissible was informed in part by
its determination in Becker that Rule 11(a)’s signature requirement is not jurisdictional in
nature. Id. at 419 (“Just as failure initially to verify a charge or sign a ‘pleading, written motion,
[or] other paper,’ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11(a), was not fatal to the petitioners’ cases in Edelman
and Becker, so here, counsel’s initial omission of the assertion that the Government’s position
lacked substantial justification is not beyond repair.” (alteration in original)).
183. Becker, 532 U.S. at 768.
184. Id. at 767.
185. Indeed, the Court has never insisted upon “perfect” compliance with Rule 3(c)’s
requirements. Even Torres and Smith, both of which emphasized that those requirements are
jurisdictional in nature, made clear that the courts of appeals are to construe them “liberally.”
Smith, 502 U.S. at 248 (instructing that “courts should construe Rule 3 liberally when
determining whether it has been complied with”); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S.
312, 316 (1988) (instructing that “the requirements of the rules of procedure should be liberally
construed”). Moreover, Smith arguably tolerates “imperfections in noticing an appeal” to the
extent that it allows virtually any document that satisfies the applicable timing and content
requirements to serve as the “functional equivalent” of a notice of appeal. Smith, 502 U.S. at
248-49 (“If a document filed within the time specified by Rule 4 gives the notice required by
Rule 3, it is effective as a notice of appeal.”).
186. Becker, 532 U.S. at 767.
187. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1) (“The notice of appeal must: (A) specify the party or parties
taking the appeal . . . ; (B) designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed; and
(C) name the court to which the appeal is taken.” (emphasis added)).
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the record as a whole — including a timely but incomplete notice of appeal and
a premature but complete notice — revealed the orders petitioner sought to
appeal.”188 In effect, the Court’s point was that the process of determining
whether “no genuine doubt exists as to who is appealing, from what judgment,
to which appellate court” requires consideration not just of the four corners of
a notice of appeal, but of the entire record in the case.189
Understood in this light, the statement of the Becker Court at issue cannot be
reconciled with the jurisdictional conception of Rule 3(c) that the Becker Court
elsewhere embraces in the same opinion.190 As noted previously, in rejecting the
position that the courts of appeals should review violations of Rule 3(c) for
harmless error, the Torres Court emphasized that “a litigant’s failure to clear a
jurisdictional hurdle can never be ‘harmless’ or waived by a court.”191 Under
Torres, therefore, a court of appeals would simply lack the authority to excuse
a notice of appeal’s failure to comply with any of the dictates of Rule 3(c), even
if, after a review of the record as a whole, “no genuine doubt exist[ed] about
who is appealing, from what judgment, to which appellate court.”192
Accordingly, the Becker Court’s contrary insinuation further suggests that
Rule 3(c)’s requirements are not entirely jurisdictional in nature after all.
III. The Disordered Enforcement of Rule 3(c) in the Courts of Appeals
As the preceding section demonstrates, the Supreme Court’s direction
concerning the content requirements of a notice of appeal has been anything but
methodical. In Foman, the Court regarded an act of noncompliance with those
requirements as a “mere technicality” that could be easily pardoned when the
appellee was neither prejudiced nor misled by the violation.193 In the subsequent
case of Torres, the Court arrived at a jurisdictional understanding of those same
requirements, and thus noncompliance would dictate dismissal of the appeal
regardless of whether the violation was prejudicial or misleading to the
appellee.194 Rather than overrule Foman as irreconcilable with this jurisdictional
understanding of Rule 3(c), however, the Court distinguished Foman on an
unconvincing basis. Even more troubling, the Court’s affirmation of the Torres
Court’s jurisdictional understanding of Rule 3(c) in Smith and Becker, not to
mention the implicit acceptance of that understanding by the Advisory
188. Becker, 532 U.S. at 768.
189. See id. at 767-68.
190. See id. at 765 (stating that “Appellate Rules 3 and 4 are indeed linked jurisdictional
provisions” (emphasis added)).
191. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 n.3 (1988).
192. Becker, 532 U.S. at 767.
193. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962).
194. See Torres, 487 U.S. at 315-17.
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Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, has been countered by
the Court’s affirmation of the approach in Foman in both FirsTier and Becker.
Not surprisingly, the enforcement of Rule 3(c)’s requirements among the
courts of appeals has become a rather disordered affair. When confronted with
a notice of appeal that contravenes a requirement of Rule 3(c), a court of appeals
may take the hard line and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, and rely
upon Torres for support. If in a more magnanimous frame of mind, the court
can rely upon Foman to excuse the violation on the basis that the defect did not
prejudice or mislead the appellee. Or, if it wishes to act in the forgiving
tradition of Foman while respecting the jurisdictional conception of Rule 3(c)
adopted in Torres, the court might sustain an appeal initiated by a defective
notice of appeal simply by determining, through a distorted construction of the
pertinent requirement of Rule 3(c), that the requirement had not been violated
at all.
The following discussion, which involves an assessment of decisions
rendered since Torres, reveals the extent to which the courts of appeals — and
sometimes the same court of appeals — have taken all of the above approaches
with regard to each of Rule 3(c)’s requirements.
A. The Party-Specification Requirement
As observed earlier, the exacting compliance that the courts of appeals had
demanded in the wake of Torres regarding Rule 3(c)’s party-specification
requirement led to a series of amendments designed to facilitate compliance with
that requirement.195 By no means, however, did those amendments eliminate the
general requirement that a notice of appeal “specify the party or parties taking
the appeal.”196 Moreover, those amendments in no way undermined the Torres
Court’s jurisdictional conception of Rule 3(c)’s requirements.197 Accordingly,
despite the liberalizing effect of the amendments, litigants have frequently lost
the opportunity to appeal solely because they contravened the party-specification
requirement.198
195. See supra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
196. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(A).
197. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 427 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2005); Reed v.
Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 933 (7th Cir. 2003); Meehan v. United Consumers Club
Franchising Corp., 312 F.3d 909, 911 (8th Cir. 2002); Corroon v. Reeve, 258 F.3d 86, 91-92
(2d Cir. 2001); Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786, 788 (8th Cir. 2001); Twenty
Mile Joint Venture, PND, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 200 F.3d 1268, 1273-74 (10th Cir. 1999); Bogle v.
Orange County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 162 F.3d 653, 660-61 (11th Cir. 1998); Maerki v.
Wilson, 128 F.3d 1005, 1007-08 (6th Cir. 1997); Billino v. Citibank, N.A., 123 F.3d 723, 72526 (2d Cir. 1997); Agee v. Paramount Commc’ns Inc., 114 F.3d 395, 399-400 (2d Cir. 1997);
Bailey v. U.S. Dep’t of Army Corps of Eng’rs, 35 F.3d 1118, 1119 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994);
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Such a lost opportunity occurred in the Tenth Circuit in Twenty Mile Joint
Venture, PND, Ltd. v. Commissioner.199 Twenty Mile involved an effort by
Twenty Mile Joint Venture (Twenty Mile) and Parker Properties Joint Venture
(Parker Properties) to challenge a ruling of the United States Tax Court in favor
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (the Commissioner).200 The operative
notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however,
specified no party other than Twenty Mile.201 Finding “no mention of Parker
Properties whatsoever” in the notice, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal of
Parker Properties for lack of jurisdiction.202
In so ruling, the Tenth Circuit demonstrated a splendid understanding of both
the rationale of Torres and the impact of the 1993 amendments to Rule 3(c).
First, the court appropriately discounted the significance of any prejudice that
the Commissioner may have suffered as a result of Parker Properties’ failure to
comply with Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement.203 The court supported
its view by reference to a prior decision acknowledging the Torres Court’s
determination that, in light of Rule 3(c)’s jurisdictional nature, a violation of one
of its requirements is not subject to review for harmless error.204 Second, the
Tenth Circuit properly rejected Parker Properties’ contention that the 1993
amendments to Rule 3(c) had the effect of overruling Torres.205 While
recognizing that “the amended rule provides somewhat more flexibility than the
language in effect when Torres was decided,” the court emphasized that the rule
“still requires that the notice of appeal make clear in some fashion the identity
of each party desiring to join the appeal.”206
Notwithstanding its faithful application of Torres in Twenty Mile, the Tenth
Circuit had employed a rather different approach when confronted with a
Argabright v. United States, 35 F.3d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1994), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996), as recognized
in Miller v. Comm’r, 310 F.3d 640, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2002).
199. 200 F.3d 1268.
200. Under Rule 13(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 3(c) governs the
content of a notice of appeal filed with the Tax Court. See FED. R. APP. P. 13(c) (“Rule 3
prescribes the contents of a notice of appeal, the manner of service, and the effect of its filing
and service.”); see also id. (“Form 2 in the Appendix of Forms is a suggested form of a notice
of appeal.”); id. app., form 2 (Notice of Appeal to a Court of Appeals from a Decision of the
United States Tax Court).
201. Twenty Mile, 200 F.3d at 1273-74.
202. Id. at 1274.
203. Id. (“The fact that the Commissioner may have suffered no prejudice is not dispositive
here.”).
204. Id. (citing In re Woosley, 855 F.2d 687, 688 (10th Cir. 1988)); see also supra note 88
and accompanying text.
205. Twenty Mile, 200 F.3d at 1274.
206. Id.
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violation of Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement just three years earlier.
In Grimsley v. MacKay,207 the court sustained the appeals of several parties who,
by the court’s own admission, had not been specified in the operative notice of
appeal.208 In refusing to dismiss those appeals, the court referred to a docketing
statement that the parties had submitted several weeks after the filing of the
notice.209 The court observed that the docketing statement contained the names
of the parties in question, “leaving no doubt as to which parties intended to
appeal and curing the defect in the notice of appeal.”210 Accordingly, the court
was satisfied with its jurisdiction over the appeals of those parties.211
The response of the Tenth Circuit in Grimsley to an obvious violation of
Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement demonstrates that the court was
operating outside of the Torres framework. Had Torres governed, the court’s
recognition that the parties in question had not been specified in the notice of
appeal, in and of itself, would have compelled a dismissal of those appeals for
want of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit, however, perceived the defect in the
notice at issue not as a jurisdictional barrier, but as a defect subject to cure
depending upon the content of other submissions in the record.
Such an approach, while contrary to Torres, falls squarely within the
forgiving tradition established in Foman. In the same manner that the Foman
Court excused an obvious violation of the judgment-designation requirement
upon determining that the appellant had conveyed an intent to appeal from the
decision in question through other submissions in the record,212 the Tenth Circuit
in Grimsley excused an obvious violation of the party-specification requirement
upon determining that the parties in question had conveyed an intent to appeal
through the docketing statement. In light of that intent, the Tenth Circuit’s
implicit conclusion was that the defect in the notice did not mislead or prejudice
the appellee,213 which warranted the exercise of jurisdiction over appeals that
would have been readily dismissed under Torres.214
207. 93 F.3d 676 (10th Cir. 1996).
208. Id. at 678.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See supra text accompanying note 52.
213. See supra text accompanying note 51.
214. This is not to say that the Tenth Circuit was wrong to consider the docketing statement
in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over those parties who had not been specified in the
initial notice of appeal. As previously noted, the Supreme Court established in Smith that
virtually any document can qualify as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal. See supra
notes 116-19 and accompanying text. The docketing statement in Grimsley, therefore, might
have stood on its own as notice of appeal, but only if it satisfied all of the requirements of
Rule 3(c), not to mention the timing requirements of Rule 4. See supra note 119 and
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In addition to considering defects in a notice of appeal as subject to cure by
other submissions in the record, the Tenth Circuit has sustained appeals
involving clear violations of Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement by
distorting the meaning of that requirement in order to determine that there was
no violation all along. In Laurino v. Tate,215 decided just one year after Twenty
Mile, the court was presented with a notice of appeal that designated an order
imposing Rule 11 sanctions against Thomas McDowell, an attorney who
represented plaintiff Frederick Laurino.216 The appellees moved to dismiss the
appeal from that decision on the basis that the notice did not specify McDowell
as an appellant, even though he was the sole individual against whom the
sanctions had been imposed.217
The Tenth Circuit ultimately reached the merits of McDowell’s appeal,
notwithstanding its observation that the notice “nowhere mentions Mr.
McDowell, except for being signed by him as attorney for [Laurino].”218
Relying upon the 1993 amendment to Rule 3(c)(4), which bars the dismissal of
an appeal “for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear
from the notice,”219 the court stressed that the sanctions order designated in the
notice “only concerns the sanctions entered against Mr. McDowell.”220 The
court thus concluded that the notice’s designation of the sanctions order
“provides sufficient evidence, by implication, of Mr. McDowell’s intention to
take an appeal from [that] order.”221
The fundamental flaw in the Laurino court’s approach is that it construes
Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement out of existence in a significant
number of cases.222 As observed above, Rule 3(c) unambiguously prescribes
accompanying text. In Grimsley, however, the court provided no indication that, in addition to
specifying the parties who were taking the appeal, the docketing statement also designated the
judgment being appealed or named the court to which the appeal was taken.
215. 220 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2000).
216. Id. at 1218.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(4); see also supra text accompanying notes 153-56.
220. Laurino, 220 F.3d at 1218.
221. Id.
222. In fairness to the Tenth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has since adopted the approach
employed in Laurino. See Retail Flooring Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Beaulieu of Am., LLC, 339
F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003). Specifically, the Ninth Circuit, relying upon amended
Rule 3(c)(4), concluded that an attorney who was not listed as an appellant in a notice of appeal
nonetheless satisfied Rule 3(c)’s party-specification requirement through the designation of the
order being appealed, considering that the order concerned only that attorney. Id. Moreover,
the Fourth Circuit had employed the same approach even before the operative amendment to
Rule 3(c)(4) took effect. See Miltier v. Downes, 935 F.2d 660, 663 n.1 (4th Cir. 1991).
XXThe Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has summarily rejected the notion that amended
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that a notice of appeal convey three discrete items of information: (1) the party
or parties who are appealing, (2) the judgment or order (or part thereof) being
appealed, and (3) the court to which the appeal is taken.223 Under the Tenth
Circuit’s notion that an implicit party specification can result from an explicit
order designation, however, the court would be constrained to regard a notice of
appeal containing the name of no party whatsoever as having specified a litigant
simply because that litigant was the only one with standing to appeal the order
designated in the notice. As a result, the determination of whether a notice of
appeal fulfills or flouts the party-specification requirement rests not on an
objective assessment of the notice’s content, but on the number of litigants
against whom the district court entered the decision being appealed.
Regrettably, the effect of the Tenth Circuit’s ruling would have been exactly the
same had it announced that, despite the jurisdictional nature of the partyspecification requirement, it would no longer enforce that requirement unless at
least two parties had standing to appeal from the decision designated in the
notice.
Regarding the Tenth Circuit’s reliance upon amended Rule 3(c)(4), it must
be observed that nothing in that provision would permit a court of appeals to
view a notice of appeal containing the name of no party as having satisfied the
party-specification requirement. Notably, the provision’s prohibition against the
dismissal of an appeal applies solely to a notice of appeal’s “failure to [specify]
a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the notice.”224 When a
notice of appeal omits any reference to a litigant as one who is seeking to appeal,
it is simply not clear from the notice that the litigant intends to appeal,225
regardless of whether the notice designates an order that concerns no other
litigant. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit’s reliance upon amended Rule 3(c)(4)
was misplaced.
B. The Judgment-Designation Requirement
The Tenth Circuit is not the only court of appeals that has experienced
difficulty in enforcing one of Rule 3(c)’s content requirements with consistency.
Rule 3(c)(4) saves an attorney’s appeal from a sanctions order (even one that concerns only that
attorney) when the notice of appeal fails to list that attorney as an appellant. See Reed v. Great
Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 933 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Although Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(4) provides that
an appeal should not be dismissed ‘for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is
otherwise clear from the notice [of appeal],’ the lawyer’s intent to appeal is not clear from the
notice of appeal — indeed is not so much as hinted at in it — and as a result we lack jurisdiction
over her challenge to the sanction that was imposed on her.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Bogle v. Orange County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 162 F.3d 653, 660 (11th Cir. 1998)).
223. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1).
224. Id. 3(c)(4) (emphasis added).
225. See Reed, 330 F.3d at 933.
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Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has had similar trouble regarding Rule 3(c)’s
requirement that a notice of appeal “designate the judgment, order, or part
thereof being appealed.”226
One manner in which the Seventh Circuit has responded to violations of the
judgment-designation requirement is to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the
nondesignated decision, relying upon the Torres Court’s jurisdictional
understanding of Rule 3(c)’s requirements. The court took this approach in
Garcia v. City of Chicago,227 in which plaintiff Rafael Garcia brought claims
against the City of Chicago, among other defendants, arising from an alleged
beating that he suffered at the hands of a Chicago police officer during an
arrest.228 One such claim was that Garcia’s rights under the Fourth Amendment
were violated because he was unable to attend the probable-cause hearing
conducted the day after his arrest.229 After the district court dismissed that
claim, Garcia appealed to the Seventh Circuit. His notice of appeal, however,
did not designate that dismissal as it related to the appellee City of Chicago.230
Citing Torres, the court characterized Garcia’s failure as “jurisdictional,” and
thus determined that it could not consider that component of Garcia’s appeal.231
Despite its reliance upon Torres in Garcia, the Seventh Circuit had expressly
repudiated Torres in favor of Foman when confronted with a violation of the
judgment-designation requirement just three years earlier, in Cook v. Navistar
International Transportation Corp..232 In Cook, plaintiff Osie Cook sustained
injuries while checking the electrical connections of a truck that was designed
and built by defendant Navistar.233 In addition to Navistar, Cook sued MidCentury Insurance Co., an insurer that had issued a worker’s-compensation
policy to Cook’s employer.234

226. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(B).
227. 24 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1994).
228. Id. at 968.
229. Id. at 969.
230. Id. at 970 n.4.
231. Id. The Seventh Circuit is not alone in this respect. Other courts of appeals have
expressly cited Torres in responding to a violation of the judgment-designation requirement by
dismissing an appeal from a particular decision for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re
Spookyworld, Inc., 346 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003); Life Plus Int’l v. Brown, 317 F.3d 799, 80405 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Glover, 242 F.3d 333, 335-37 (6th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 756-57 (6th Cir. 1999); Klaudt v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior, 990 F.2d 409, 411 (8th Cir. 1993); Nolan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 973 F.2d 843, 84647 (10th Cir. 1992); Faysound Ltd. v. Falcon Jet Corp., 940 F.2d 339, 342-43 (8th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam).
232. 940 F.2d 207, 211 (7th Cir. 1991).
233. Id. at 208.
234. Id. at 210.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006

308

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:271

Cook eventually prevailed at trial, and the district court entered judgment
against Navistar on October 4, 1989.235 The district court did not, however,
adjudicate Cook’s claim against Mid-Century.236 The Seventh Circuit thus
dismissed Cook’s appeal from the October 4 judgment.237 On remand, the
district court entered a final judgment against Navistar under Rule 54(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on August 29, 1990.238 As for Mid-Century,
the district court entered a final judgment on September 5, 1990, and then
entered a modified final judgment on October 12, 1990.239
Cook subsequently sought to appeal to the Seventh Circuit from the
August 29 judgment entered under Rule 54(b).240 Rather than making any
reference to that judgment, however, Cook’s notice of appeal designated only
the judgments entered on October 4, 1989; September 5, 1990; and October 12,
1990, respectively.241 This posed a problem for Cook because, as the Seventh
Circuit noted, “[t]he October 4, 1989 ‘judgment’ was invalid, and the other two
identified judgments dealt solely with Mid-Century.”242 Navistar soon seized
upon the defect in Cook’s notice and argued that, under Torres, the court had no
jurisdiction to review the August 29 judgment in light of Cook’s failure to
comply with Rule 3(c)’s judgment-designation requirement.243
The Seventh Circuit ultimately rejected Navistar’s jurisdictional contention
and reached the merits of Cook’s appeal from that judgment.244 Although
acknowledging that Torres was “somewhat analogous to the facts in this case,”
the court found Foman to be “more precisely on point.”245 The court then
observed that, having “briefed and argued the merits of the underlying judgment
in this case knowing full well that Cook intended to appeal the adverse jury
verdict,” Navistar could not argue at that late point that “it has been prejudiced
by the defect in Cook’s notice of appeal.”246 In the end, by opting to abide by
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. Presumably, the basis of the court’s dismissal was that the district court’s October
4 judgment was not a “final decision” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 in light of the
unresolved claims involving Mid-Century.
238. Cook, 940 F.2d at 210. Rule 54(b) authorizes a district court to enter final judgment
on fewer than all claims or parties in an action “upon an express determination that there is no
just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
239. Cook, 940 F.2d at 210.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 211.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. (citation omitted).
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Foman rather than Torres, the court was able to reach the merits of Cook’s
appeal from a judgment that appeared nowhere in his notice of appeal.
In addition to following the forgiving approach of Foman, the Seventh Circuit
has sustained an appeal involving flagrant violations of Rule 3(c)’s judgmentdesignation requirement by distorting the meaning of that requirement in order
to conclude that there was no violation all along. In Librizzi v. Children’s
Memorial Medical Center,247 Gilbert Librizzi brought suit against the Children’s
Memorial Medical Center, his former employer, to recover benefits to which he
was allegedly entitled under a pension plan.248 The district court dismissed the
suit as untimely and entered judgment in January 1997.249 Librizzi later brought
a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied in March 1997.250
Librizzi subsequently sought to appeal from both the judgment and the denial
of his motion for reconsideration.251 In his notice of appeal to the Seventh
Circuit, however, Librizzi failed to designate the denial of the motion along with
the judgment.252
In rejecting the Medical Center’s assertion that this obvious defect in
Librizzi’s notice carried jurisdictional repercussions, the Seventh Circuit was
satisfied that the notice contained no defect at all.253 The court reasoned that a
notice of appeal’s designation of an underlying judgment “brings up all of the
issues in the case” for purposes of Rule 3(c)’s judgment-designation
requirement.254 “Pointing to either an interlocutory order or a post-judgment
decision such as an order denying a motion to alter or amend the judgment is
never necessary,” the court explained, “unless the appellant wants to confine the
appellate issues to those covered in the specific order.”255 Accordingly, the court
reviewed the district court’s denial of Librizzi’s motion for reconsideration even
though the notice made no mention of that decision.
In fairness to the Seventh Circuit, the judgment-designation requirement has
never been understood as demanding that a notice of appeal make explicit
reference to each decision that an appellant wishes to challenge on appeal. The
courts of appeals have universally recognized that, when a notice of appeal
designates a final judgment in an action, the notice effectively designates all

247. 134 F.3d 1302 (7th Cir. 1998).
248. Id. at 1304.
249. Id. at 1305-06.
250. Id. at 1306.
251. Id. at 1305-06.
252. Id. (observing that “Librizzi’s notice of appeal identifies the judgment of January 1997,
rather than the order of March 1997 denying reconsideration, as the order under review”).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1306.
255. Id.
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interlocutory decisions encompassed by or merging into that judgment.256 In
Librizzi, however, the decision that the notice of appeal failed to designate was
neither one that was encompassed by the underlying judgment nor one that
merged into the underlying judgment, considering that the district court’s denial
of Librizzi’s motion for reconsideration did not occur until after the underlying
judgment had already been entered. The Seventh Circuit was thus incorrect in
asserting that a party “brings up all of the issues in the case”257 by designating
nothing more than the underlying judgment in a notice of appeal.
In addition, the explicit language of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure establishes that a notice of appeal must designate a disposition of the
type of motion at issue in Librizzi in order to satisfy the judgment-designation
requirement. Under Rule 4(a)(4)(A), when a litigant timely files one of several
enumerated post-judgment motions — including a motion to alter or amend the
judgment under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure258 — the time
to appeal from the underlying judgment runs “for all parties from the entry . . .

256. See, e.g., McBride v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 281 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2002)
(“[A] notice of appeal which names the final judgment is sufficient to support review of all
earlier orders that merge into the judgment.”); Greer v. St. Louis Reg’l Med. Ctr., 258 F.3d 843,
846 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Ordinarily, a notice of appeal that specifies the final judgment in a case
should be understood to bring up for review all of the previous rulings and orders that led up
to and served as a predicate for that final judgment.”); Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1031
(7th Cir. 2000) (“In general, a notice of appeal from a final judgment . . . is adequate to bring
up everything that preceded it.”); Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000) (“An
appeal from a final judgment draws into question all earlier, non-final orders and rulings which
produced the judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United Ass’n of
Journeymen & Apprentices v. Bechtel Constr. Co., 128 F.3d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 1997));
John’s Insulation, Inc. v. L. Addison & Assocs., 156 F.3d 101, 105 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[I]t has
been uniformly held that a notice of appeal that designates the final judgment encompasses not
only that judgment, but also all earlier interlocutory orders that merge in the judgment.”); Trust
Co. of La. v. N.N.P. Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 1485 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[A]n appeal from a final
judgment sufficiently preserves all prior orders intertwined with the final judgment.”); Cattin
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 955 F.2d 416, 428 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t is well settled in this circuit that
an appeal from a final judgment draws into question all prior non-final rulings and orders.”);
Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 930 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he appeal from a final judgment
draws into question all prior non-final orders and rulings which produced the judgment.”); see
also 20 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 303.21[3][c][iii] (“An appeal from the final judgment
usually draws into question all prior nonfinal orders and all rulings which produced the
judgment.”); 16A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 2, § 3949.4 (“[A] notice of appeal
that names the final judgment is sufficient to support review of all earlier orders that merge in
the final judgment under the general rule that appeal from a final judgment supports review of
all earlier interlocutory orders.”).
257. See Librizzi, 134 F.3d at 1306.
258. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv).
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of the last such remaining motion.”259 The Rule further provides that a litigant
who seeks to challenge the disposition of a Rule 4(a)(4)(A) motion “must file
a notice of appeal, or an amended notice of appeal — in compliance with Rule
3(c) — within the time prescribed by this Rule measured from the entry of the
order disposing of the last such remaining motion.”260 By expressly linking
compliance with Rule 3(c) with the filing of a notice of appeal, or the amending
of a previously filed notice of appeal, after the disposition of a Rule 4(a)(4)(A)
motion, the Rules make abundantly clear that the judgment-designation
requirement will not be satisfied as to an appeal from that disposition if the
notice designates nothing more than the underlying judgment.
Notwithstanding these clear dictates, the Seventh Circuit in Librizzi asserted
that a notice of appeal need not ordinarily designate “a post-judgment decision
such as an order denying a motion to alter or amend the judgment.”261 The court
thus felt free to review the disposition of such a motion even though the only
decision designated in Librizzi’s notice of appeal was the underlying judgment.
In so doing, the court distorted the judgment-designation requirement to the
point where the relevant provisions of Rule 4 no longer exist.
C. The Court-Naming Requirement
As with the party-specification and judgment-designation requirements, the
courts of appeals have experienced difficulty in consistently applying
Rule 3(c)’s requirement that a notice of appeal “name the court to which the
appeal is taken.”262 One approach is to respond to a violation of the courtnaming requirement by dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction in
accordance with Torres. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit pursued this
course in United States v. Webb,263 in which Earl Anthony Webb’s effort to
appeal from his conviction and sentence was stifled by the failure of his notice
of appeal to name a court of appeals.264 The Sixth Circuit’s analysis emphasized
the jurisdictional understanding of Rule 3(c) as developed in Torres and
reiterated in Smith, while pointing out that the 1993 amendments did nothing to
alter that understanding.265 The court ultimately concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction over Webb’s appeal “[i]n light of Rule 3(c)’s clear mandate that a
notice of appeal must name the court to which the appeal is taken, coupled with
259. Id. 4(a)(4)(A).
260. Id. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
261. Librizzi, 134 F.3d at 1306.
262. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(C).
263. 157 F.3d 451, 452-53 (6th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), abrogated by Dillon v. United
States, 184 F.3d 556, 557-58 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
264. Id. at 452.
265. Id.; see also supra note 157 and accompanying text.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006

312

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:271

the well-established principle that the requirements of Rule 3(c) are
jurisdictional in nature.”266
An entirely different response to a violation of the court-naming requirement,
which the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has employed, is to act in the
forgiving tradition of Foman and excuse the defect because it neither misleads
nor prejudices the appellee.267 In Anderson v. District of Columbia,268 Grant
Anderson brought suit in federal court against the District of Columbia, alleging
that several of its police officers had used excessive force in arresting him.269
The district court subsequently entered summary judgment in favor of the
District, and Grant sought to appeal.270 Although the D.C. Circuit was the only
court of appeals with jurisdiction to review the decision in question,271
Anderson’s notice of appeal named the Supreme Court of the United States as
the pertinent appellate tribunal.272
In holding that Anderson’s notice of appeal was not fatally defective, the D.C.
Circuit highlighted that it was “the only [court] to which Anderson may

266. Webb, 157 F.3d at 453. The approach in Webb has been criticized in one treatise as
“unduly harsh, as there is only one court to which the appeal could be taken.” MICHAEL E.
TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE § 6.02 n.18 (3d ed.
1999).
267. At least two other courts of appeals have used this same approach in connection with
the court-naming requirement. See United States v. Treto-Haro, 287 F.3d 1000, 1002 n.1 (10th
Cir. 2002) (“The Government’s failure to identify this Court in its notice of appeal, while
careless if not inexcusable, did not prejudice or mislead [the appellee]. Accordingly, we
conclude the Government’s notice of appeal is sufficient to provide us with jurisdiction.”); Ortiz
v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1125 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Although designation of the court
to which the appeal is taken is a mandatory requirement under Rule 3(c), the defect is not fatal
where the intention to appeal to a certain court may be inferred from the notice and the defect
has not misled the appellee.”).
268. 72 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
269. Id. at 167.
270. Id.
271. Except for certain types of decisions that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has exclusive jurisdiction to review, see generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c)-(d), 1295 (2000), the
only forum in which an appellant may appeal a district court’s decision is the court of appeals
for the circuit comprising the pertinent judicial district, see id. § 1294(1) (providing that an
appeal shall be taken “[f]rom a district court of the United States to the court of appeals for the
circuit embracing the district”).
XXBecause Anderson filed his action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
see Anderson, 72 F.3d at 167, and the decision is not one that the Federal Circuit had exclusive
jurisdiction to review, the D.C. Circuit was the only court in which Anderson could have
appealed. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000) (stating that the D.C. Circuit encompasses the District of
Columbia).
272. Anderson, 72 F.3d at 167.
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appeal.”273 Notwithstanding that the notice made no mention of the D.C.
Circuit, the court found that the document conferred “fair notice” both to
Anderson’s adversary and to the court, considering that “it was obvious in which
court [Anderson’s] appeal properly lay.”274 “Because the intention to appeal to
this court may be inferred from Anderson’s notice, and the defect in the notice
has not materially misled the appellee,” the court was satisfied with its
jurisdiction over the appeal.275
A third approach to a violation of Rule 3(c)’s court-naming requirement is to
sustain the appeal not by resorting to the forgiving tradition of Foman, but
instead by distorting that requirement in order to find that there was no violation
in the first place. The Sixth Circuit adopted this approach when, one year after
its decision in Webb, the court conducted an en banc reevaluation of the courtnaming requirement in Dillon v. United States.276 In Dillon, the notice of appeal
submitted by Thomas Dillon, like that in Webb, did not contain the name of a
court of appeals.277 Despite its understanding of the jurisdictional nature of the

273. Id. at 168.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 169. Although the D.C. Circuit’s approach is perfectly justifiable under Foman,
the same result would have obtained even if the court had determined that the question of its
jurisdiction over Anderson’s appeal was governed by Torres. In particular, when a litigant’s
notice of appeal names a court that lacks jurisdiction over the appeal, that court may transfer the
appeal to the court that would have had jurisdiction over the appeal at the time that the notice
was filed, and the appeal will proceed in the transferee court as if it had been filed there in the
first place. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000) (“Whenever . . . an appeal . . . is noticed for . . . a court
and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of
justice, transfer such . . . appeal to any other such court in which the . . . appeal could have been
brought at the time it was . . . noticed, and the . . . appeal shall proceed as if it had
been . . . noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was
actually . . . noticed for the court from which it is transferred.”); see also 20 MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 2, § 303.21[3][d] (“If an appeal is improperly noticed to a court that lacks
jurisdiction, that court may nevertheless transfer the appeal to the proper court, as long as the
notice would have been timely if filed in the proper court.”).
XXIn light of this transfer mechanism, the D.C. Circuit in Anderson should have given the
Supreme Court, as the only tribunal named in Anderson’s notice of appeal, the prerogative of
determining the disposition of Anderson’s appeal. The Supreme Court, in turn, would almost
certainly have responded by returning the appeal via transfer to the D.C. Circuit, where the
appeal would have proceeded as if Anderson had filed it there initially. See 20 MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 2, § 303.21[3][d]. In the end, the D.C. Circuit would have reached the merits of
Anderson’s appeal only after having demonstrated due regard for the court-naming requirement,
rather than communicating to litigants that a failure to comply with that requirement is readily
forgivable.
276. 184 F.3d 556, 557-58 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
277. Id. at 557.
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court-naming requirement in light of Torres,278 a majority of the en banc court
nevertheless concluded that the panel should have exercised jurisdiction over the
appeal.279
The court reached its conclusion by drawing a distinction between appeals
over which only a single court of appeals would have jurisdiction, and appeals
over which more than one court of appeals would have jurisdiction.280 When an
appeal falls into the latter category, the court stated, the “failure to designate the
court of appeal will result in dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”281
On the other hand, when only a single appellate forum is available, the
appellant’s act of “filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court
from whose judgment the appeal is taken has the practical effect of designating
the appropriate court of appeals and thereby eliminating any possible confusion
with respect to the appellate forum.”282 Upon determining that “the Sixth Circuit
represented the only appellate court available to petitioner,” the court was
satisfied that “the notice of appeal was not defective because petitioner did not
have a choice of forum and filed his notice of appeal in the district court that
rendered judgment.”283
The only legal authority offered by the Dillon court in support of its approach
was an Advisory Committee statement accompanying the 1993 amendments to
Rule 3(c).284 Although acknowledging that those amendments were directed
solely at facilitating compliance with Rule 3(c)’s party-specification
requirement,285 the court found that the “underlying rationale” of the
amendments applied equally to the court-naming requirement.286 The court
focused specifically upon the Advisory Committee’s observation that “if a court
determines it is objectively clear that a party intended to appeal, there are neither
administrative concerns nor fairness concerns that should prevent the appeal
from going forward.”287 Incorporating that language into its new standard for the
court-naming requirement, the court reasoned that “[w]hen ‘there is only one
appellate forum available to a litigant, there are neither administrative concerns
nor fairness concerns that should prevent the appeal from going forward’ if,
278. Id. at 558 (“While Torres specifically concerned the proper construction of
Rule 3(c)(1)(A), it made clear that the entire rule was jurisdictional in nature.”).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 557-58.
281. Id. at 558.
282. Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 558.
285. Id. (noting that “the 1993 amendments were aimed at ameliorating the effect of Rule
3(c)(1)(A)”).
286. Id.
287. Id. (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) advisory committee’s note (1993 Amendments)).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss2/2

2006]

RESCUING RULE 3(c)

315

through inadvertence, an appellant has failed to name the court to which the
appeal is taken.”288
Although the Dillon court’s analysis suffers from several significant
shortcomings, perhaps the most egregious is that it entirely purges the courtnaming requirement from Rule 3(c).289 This consequence follows from the
court’s conclusion that a notice of appeal need not explicitly name a court of
appeals unless the appellant may take the appeal to more than one appellate
forum.290 In reaching this conclusion, however, the court failed to comprehend
that there is never more than one appellate forum available to a litigant whose
appeal is governed by Rule 3. Put another way, if a decision may be challenged
only through the filing of a notice of appeal that must satisfy the content
requirements of Rule 3(c), there is one (and only one) court of appeals that could
have jurisdiction to review the decision.291 Accordingly, although the Dillon
288. Id. (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) advisory committee’s note (1993 Amendments)).
289. As one might expect, the majority’s approach in Dillon produced extensive criticism
from the judges in dissent, who persuasively argued that the en banc court offered no viable
legal basis for limiting the application of Rule 3(c)’s court-naming requirement in such a
manner. Id. at 558-66. Judge Ryan derided the court for having produced an “800-pound
gorilla rule,” construing the court’s holding as conveying the message that “even though this
court has no authority whatever to excuse compliance with Rule 3(c)(1)(C), it nevertheless has
the ‘power’ to do so because more active judges on this court are willing to excuse
noncompliance with the rule than are unwilling to do so.” Id. at 559 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
Similarly, Judge Clay remarked that “there exists no legal authority for this judicial rewriting
of the rule by which the majority blithely repudiates the [court-naming requirement] without any
discernibly cogent reason, explanation or basis for its decision to do so.” Id. at 560 (Clay, J.,
dissenting). Judge Gilman, while expressing sympathy for the majority’s approach, could not
join it because there was no “justifiable way to ignore the clear requirements of Rule 3(c)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.”
Id. at 566 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
290. See supra text accompanying notes 280-83.
291. The two categories of appeals governed by Rule 3 are appeals as of right from decisions
of the federal district courts, see supra note 17 and accompanying text, and appeals from
decisions of the U.S. Tax Court, see supra note 200 and accompanying text. As observed
earlier, the only forum in which a litigant may appeal the decision of a district court is the court
of appeals for the circuit comprising the pertinent judicial district, unless the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review the decision. See supra note 271 and
accompanying text. Accordingly, a litigant will have only a single appellate forum available to
appeal from any decision of a district court.
XXWith regard to decisions of the Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a) (2000) delineates the
appropriate appellate forum. The forum in question will depend primarily upon whether the
case falls into one of six enumerated categories. Id. § 7482(b)(1)(A)-(F). For example, in the
case of a non-corporate petitioner who seeks redetermination of tax liability, the Tax Court’s
decision may be appealed to the federal court of appeals for the circuit encompassing the
petitioner’s legal residence. Id. § 7482(b)(1)(A). If none of those six categories apply, the D.C.
Circuit has jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. § 7482(b)(1). Notwithstanding these provisions,
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court may have stressed that it had no intention of waiving the court-naming
requirement,292 it did precisely that by holding that a notice of appeal must
explicitly “name the court to which the appeal is taken” only in a category of
cases that simply does not exist.293 The effect of Dillon is thus that every notice
of appeal filed with the Sixth Circuit necessarily complies with the court-naming
requirement, making it impossible to violate that requirement.
IV. The Case for a No-Nonsense Approach to the Enforcement of Rule 3(c)
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the enforcement of Rule 3(c)’s
requirements by the courts of appeals has become mired in confusion and
unpredictability. It is difficult to expect any other outcome, however,
considering that the Supreme Court held in Foman that noncompliance with
those requirements was readily pardonable and thus should have no effect on an
appeal, then held in Torres — while purporting to reconcile Foman — that such
noncompliance was necessarily fatal to an appeal, and has since reaffirmed both
approaches on various occasions. In light of this inconsistency, it is not
surprising that several courts of appeals have shifted radically from one
approach to another within a span of just a few years. Nor is it surprising that
some courts, rather than arbitrarily choosing between Foman and Torres, have
addressed an act of noncompliance with a requirement of Rule 3(c) simply by
construing that requirement out of existence. The end result is that litigants to
an appeal cannot predict with any degree of confidence how a court of appeals

a taxpayer and the government may stipulate in writing that the decision in question may be
reviewed in a particular court of appeals, id. § 7482(b)(2), but “[i]n the case of any decision of
the Tax Court in a proceeding under section 7478,” the decision may only be reviewed by the
D.C. Circuit, id. § 7482(b)(3).
XXThe significant feature of the foregoing regime is that only a single appellate forum will be
available to a litigant who seeks to appeal from an adverse decision of the Tax Court.
Accordingly, the Dillon court’s reference to an appeal from a Tax Court decision as an example
of an appeal in which more than one appellate forum would be available, see Dillon, 184 F.3d
at 558 & n.1, is simply incorrect.
XXIn addition to appeals from Tax Court decisions, the Dillon court cited appeals involving
claims for “black lung benefits” and appeals from “NLRB actions” as among those in which
more than one appellate forum would be available. Id. at 558 n.1. But the relevant decisionmaking bodies in those cases are federal administrative agencies, not courts. And when a
litigant seeks to challenge a decision of a federal administrative agency, the initiating document
is not a notice of appeal filed with the district court in accordance with Rule 3 but a petition for
review filed with the court of appeals in accordance with Rule 15. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text. Accordingly, an appeal from a decision of an administrative agency does
not implicate Rule 3(c)’s court-naming requirement.
292. Dillon, 184 F.3d at 558.
293. Id. at 557 (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(C)).
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will respond to a notice of appeal that violates one or more of Rule 3(c)’s
requirements.
The Supreme Court now bears the responsibility of restoring order and
predictability to the enforcement of Rule 3(c) by demanding that the courts of
appeals apply a no-nonsense approach to defective notices of appeal. Such an
approach would involve two components. First and foremost, a court of appeals
must treat an outright failure to abide by a requirement of Rule 3(c) as nothing
other than a violation of that requirement. This is not to say that the courts of
appeals should disregard the Supreme Court’s repeated admonition that the
requirements of Rule 3(c) be liberally construed.294 Indeed, it is entirely
appropriate for a court to give a litigant the benefit of the doubt when a goodfaith effort at compliance is less than exact. It is entirely inappropriate,
however, for a court to distort the meaning of a requirement in order to
transform an outright violation into an act of compliance, as the Sixth Circuit did
in Dillon by effectively holding that a notice of appeal containing the name of
no court of appeals whatsoever had “name[d] the court to which the appeal is
taken” within the meaning of Rule 3(c).295 The effect of such an exercise is to
amend an established procedural rule by judicial fiat, rather than by the
administrative mechanism envisioned by Congress.
Second, once satisfied that a requirement of Rule 3(c) has been violated, a
court of appeals must dismiss the appeal in accordance with the jurisdictional
conception of Rule 3(c) adopted in Torres. In this regard, the Supreme Court
should take the first possible opportunity to address the continuing viability of
Foman, and do away with it once and for all. If the Court’s aim is truly to
remedy the disordered enforcement of Rule 3(c)’s requirements, it can no longer
afford to countenance a decision that characterizes a violation of one of those
requirements as a “mere technicality” and permits a court of appeals to reach the
merits of an appeal so long as the violation did not mislead or prejudice the
appellee.296 Indeed, Foman is a prescription not for the enforcement of
Rule 3(c)’s requirements, but for the circumvention of those requirements.
An unfortunate consequence of treating Rule 3(c) as a jurisdictional
prerequisite is that many litigants will lose the opportunity to prosecute their
appeals. It is particularly troubling when a litigant would have successfully
obtained relief from the decision below but for a Rule 3(c)-based dismissal of
the appeal. One can certainly understand how a court of appeals would be
tempted to overlook an act of noncompliance with Rule 3(c) when doing so
would allow it to effect justice in that individual case. But as Justice Scalia
294. See supra note 185.
295. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(C).
296. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962).
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observed in Torres, a sanction for the failure to comply with a procedural rule
“always prevents the court from deciding where justice lies in the particular
case, on the theory that securing a fair and orderly process enables more justice
to be done in the totality of cases.”297 Considering how disorderly and
unpredictable the enforcement of Rule 3(c) has become, it is high time that the
Supreme Court shift the focus of the courts of appeals to the totality of cases.
To the extent that dismissals of appeals become unacceptably high, the
mechanism of rule amendment remains available to ease compliance with
Rule 3(c)’s requirements, as was done with the party-specification requirement
in 1993, or to abolish one or more of them altogether.
Conclusion
The uncomplicated nature of Rule 3(c)’s content requirements has not
translated into uncomplicated enforcement of those requirements by the federal
courts of appeals. But the difficulty experienced by the courts of appeals in
enforcing Rule 3(c)’s requirements is understandable in light of the Supreme
Court’s inconsistent guidance on the nature of those requirements. The Court
established in Foman that violations of those requirements can be readily
excused, then shifted to a jurisdictional conception of those requirements in
Torres without making a clean break with Foman, and has since reaffirmed both
approaches notwithstanding that they simply cannot be reconciled.
Consequently, the same court of appeals can address the same violation of a
requirement of Rule 3(c) by dismissing the appeal under Torres for lack of
jurisdiction, or overlook the violation under Foman if satisfied that the defect
did not prejudice or mislead the appellee. Then again, in an effort to respect
both the Torres Court’s jurisdictional conception of Rule 3(c)’s requirements,
while operating in the spirit of forgiveness mandated by Foman, the court might
distort the meaning of the relevant requirement of Rule 3(c) in an effort to
conclude that there was no violation at all.
The solution to this problem of confusion and unpredictability in the
enforcement of Rule 3(c) is the adoption of a no-nonsense approach to defective
notices of appeal. By treating a litigant’s noncompliance with a requirement of
Rule 3(c) as such, and responding to that noncompliance by dismissing the
appeal pursuant to the jurisdictional conception of Rule 3(c) espoused in Torres,
the courts of appeals would successfully restore the fair and orderly enforcement
of Rule 3(c) that has been so sorely lacking.

297. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
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